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SCENIC LANDSCAPE PROTECTION UNDER THE 
POLICE POWER 
Mark Bobrowski* 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 
-Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
The landscape and the language 
are the same 
For we ourselves are landscape 
and are land. 
-Conrad Aiken, A Letter from Li Po and Other Poems (1955).1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Protection of visual resources has been an acknowledged goal of 
environmental management for at least a generation. For example, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agen-
cies, in their decisionmaking processes, to "assure for all Americans 
safe, healthy, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings."2 Many state environmental policy acts contain similar 
* Professor, New England School of Law; B.A. 1973, Ithaca College; M.A. 1975, University of 
Oregon; J.D. 1985, New England School of Law. 
1 Quoted in Alan Gussow, "Conserving the Magnitude of Uselessness: A Philosophical Per-
spective," paper presented at the National Conference on Applied Techniques for Analysis and 
Management of the Visual Resource, Incline Village, Nevada, Apr. 23-25, 1979 at 10. 
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
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guidance.3 The protected visual resource may be a "viewshed"-a 
vista featuring mountains and hillsides, riverbanks and watercourses, 
villages and farms, or other areas of natural or cultural beauty. In a 
more urban setting, the visual resource may instead be a "view cor-
ridor" -an architectural opening or transportation corridor in the 
cityscape that frames a natural or cultural scenic feature. NEPA and 
its progeny operate on the assumption that such visual resources 
provide an opportunity for "aesthetic experiences,"4 which are highly 
valued by the public.5 Yet the visual landscape rightly has been called 
our "most maligned, ignored, [and] unappreciated natural resource."6 
This Article chronicles the efforts of local governments7 to protect 
their visual resources-and the judicial response to these efforts-
since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Berman v. Parker.8 
Viewed from an historical perspective, protection of the visual re-
source is one of the last frontiers in local regulation of the environ-
ment. Beginning in the 1960s, local governments addressed one after 
another of their "critical" resources. First to be identified and protected 
3 Some states include visual impact assessment as a part of their general environmental 
impact review procedures, and courts generally endorse this process on review. See, e.g., Save 
S.F. Bay Ass'n v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 117, 133 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992), review denied 1993 Cal. LEXIS 406 (Jan. 21, 1993) (view corridor analysis under 
California's Environmental Quality Act); Steele v. Town of Salem Planning Bd., 606 N.Y.S.2d 
810 (App. Div. 1994) (viewshed analysis required under New York's State Environmental 
Quality Review Act); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 742 P.2d 1266 (Wash. Ct. App.1987) 
(adverse impact on views proper finding under Washington's State EnVironmental Policy Act). 
4 See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
5 NEPA itself states, "it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means ... to ... assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically 
and culturally pleasing surroundings; . . . preserve important historic, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which sup-
ports diversity." NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988). 
6 Gussow, supra note 1, at 7. 
7 The term "local governments" refers to those cities, towns, and counties invested with police 
power (particularly, zoning) to regulate the use of land. Of course, state governments have also 
acted to protect specific scenic resources. See, e.g., Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13:18A-2. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the Act in Gardner v. New Jersey 
Pine lands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991). See also, Bel Mar Estates v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 3d 936 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (denying subdivision on the basis of impact 
to view); McCormick v. Lawrence, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (upholding view 
regulations within New York's Adirondack Park); Issuance of a CAMA Minor Dev. Permit v. 
Town of Bath, 345 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding view restrictions within North 
Carolina's Coastal Area Management Act); Scott v. State, 541 P.2d 516 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) 
(upholding view provisions with Oregon's Scenic Waterways Act); In re McShinsky, 572 A.2d 
916 (Vt. 1990) (denying campground under Act 250, in part, because of impacts to view); 
Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (upholding 
view restrictions under Washington's Shoreline Management Act). 
8348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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were wetlands.9 In the same decade, local governments protected 
flood plains.lO With these models for action in place, local environmental 
protection was extended in the next generation to aquifersll and 
watersheds.I2 In shore areas, the potential for catastrophe has encour-
aged enactment of dune and barrier-beach protection ordinances.13 
Diminishing agricultural lands have received special attention.14 Yet 
despite this plethora of often overlapping resource protection dis-
tricts, some visual resources remain unguarded. According to the 
Boston Globe, "two-thirds of the most scenic five percent of the Mas-
sachusetts landscape remains unprotected."15 In taking steps to pro-
tect visual resources, cities and towns are simply moving to fulfill 
their responsibilities to the local environment. 
Of course, the growth of the tourist industry has inspired local 
governments to take steps to protect scenic areas. Tourism now ac-
counts for six to seven percent of the gross domestic product of the 
United States.16 Travel ranks as the third largest retail industry in 
terms of sales and the second largest in terms of private employ-
ment.17 Nationally, 1993 figures indicate that tourism accounted for a 
contribution of $309 billion to the economy.I8 In states renowned for 
9 For example, Massachusetts adopted its wetlands statute in 1967. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 131, 
§ 40 (1989). Oregon adopted its wetlands protection statute in 1973. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 196.800-
.990 (1991). 
10 The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (Title XIII of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968), now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), required cities 
and towns to adopt flood plain ordinances as a precondition of flood plain insurance. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4012(c) (1988). The federal government thereafter began mapping flood plains, and provided 
the findings to local governments in the form of Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). These 
resources proved useful in developing local controls. Approximately 3,000 communities had 
adopted local regulations by 1981. See ABA, MATERIALS ON FLOODPLAINS AND WETLANDS: 
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS, ABA (Robbins & Lagerroos eds., 1981). 
11 The protection of groundwater may be traced back to Section 208 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1256, 1288, 1313 (1988), which mandated that all state 
governments develop management plans to maintain or improve existing water quality, includ-
ing groundwater. 
12 Watershed protection is largely a spinoff of aquifer protection. For a recent example of 
watershed protection on a regional basis, see 1993 Mass. Acts 495, which protects the watershed 
of the Wachusett Reservoir, one of Boston's sources for drinking water. 
13 These local regulations were triggered by the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1451 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
14 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
15 Ronald Lee Fleming, Suburban Sprawl Blights Cities, Tho, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1994. 
16 Elizabeth Brabec and Kevin Kirby, The Value of Nature and Scenery, SCENIC AM. TECH-
NICAL BULL., Vol. 1, No.3, at 2 (1992). 
17 JOHN D. HUNT, ToURIST EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON AMERICANS OUTDOORS: A LITERATURE REVIEW (1986). 
18 UNITED STATES TRAVEL DATA CENTER, NATIONAL TRAVEL SURVEY (1993). Over a billion 
person trips accounted for this total. [d. 
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beautiful vistas, the promotion of tourism has become public policy. 
For example, in 1993, the Wyoming Department of Tourism spent $1.6 
million to attract seven million visitors, who contributed an estimated 
$1.5 billion to the state's economy.19 In Maine, the Office of Tourism spent 
$1.6 million in 1991 to attract 8.7 million visitors, who contributed $2.75 
billion to the economy.20 The figures for other tourist destinations such 
as New Hampshire,21 Vermont,22 Montana,23 and Idaho24 are comparable. 
In order to protect the scenic landscape-and, not coincidentally, to 
attract tourists-local governments, acting under their police pow-
ers,25 have employed a variety of devices. The enactment of these 
devices has occurred within the context of a long-running legal debate 
over the validity of "aesthetic" regulation.26 Since Berman, the high-
est court in nearly every state has wrestled with the concept of 
19 Telephone Interview with Chuck Coon, Public Information Manager, Wyoming Dep't of 
Tourism (Feb. 1, 1995). 
20 Telephone Interview with Marjorie Wright, Tourism Specialist, Maine Office of Tourism 
(Feb. 1, 1995). 
21 New Hampshire estimates a total contribution to its economy from tourism of more than 
$4 billion annually, as of 1994, compared with a figure of $104 million for 1954, the year of the 
Supreme Court's Bernwn decision. Telephone Interview with Chris Jennings, Director, New 
Hampshire Office of Travel and Tourism Development (Feb. 1, 1995). 
22 Vermont estimates a 1993 contribution of $1.8 billion to the local economy from tourism, 
with 6.5 million visitors annually. Telephone Interview with Jed Guertin, Director of Travel 
Research, Vermont Department of Travel (Feb. 1, 1995). 
23 Montana's economy received a contribution of $1.1 billion in 1993 from tourism, with 7.5 
million visits. Telephone Interview with Janice Wannebo, Administrative Assistant to the 
Director, Travel Montana (Feb. 1, 1995). 
24 Idaho estimated, in 1993, that tourism contributed $1.8 billion to the local economy, with 6.5 
million visits. Telephone Interview with Mike Thuleen, Economic Development Analyst, De-
partment of Commerceillivision of Tourism Development (Feb. 1, 1995). 
25 The term "police power" is a slippery concept, not susceptible to exact definition. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 60 Mass. 53, 85 (1851) ("It is much easier to perceive and realize the 
existence and sources of this power, than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its 
exercise."). McQuillin's The Law of Municipal Corporations offers some guidance: 
[Tlhe term "police power," in its original and most comprehensive meaning, denotes 
the power of government in every sovereignty, that is to say, the power to govern men 
and things. It is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, necessary to the effective conduct 
and maintenance of government. It has been denominated as the public right to 
reasonable regulation for the common good and welfare. Moreover, it is the power to 
regulate the conduct of subjects toward each other and the manner in which each shall 
use his own property when regulation becomes necessary for the public good. 
6A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §24.02, at 10 (Charles R.P. 
Keating ed., 3d ed. 1987). 
26 Simply put, a regulation promotes aesthetic objectives when it is designed to affect the 
appearance of a community. See, generally, ROBERT M. ANDERSON, LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING, § 7.13 (3d ed. 1986); see also Frank Michelman, Thward a Practical Standard for 
Aesthetic Regulation, 15 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 36 (1969) ("An 'aesthetic interest' ... has 
been invaded whenever a person is forced to look at what he would rather not see or prevented 
from looking at what he would rather see.") 
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land-use regulation for aesthetic objectives. Without rehashing this 
oft-described controversy,z7 a brief summary may be useful. 
A reviewing court assessing whether aesthetic regulation is per-
missible first must address the scope of the applicable enabling legis-
lation. 'lYpically, a municipality or county is authorized to use the 
police power to promote "the health, safety, morals, or the general 
welfare of the community."28 All regulations, including those which 
further an aesthetic objective, must serve an enunciated purpose of 
the enabling legislation in order to pass constitutional muster. Tradi-
tionally, local land-use regulations have been rooted in promotion of 
public health and safety.29 However, where a regulation furthers only 
an aesthetic objective,30 such as protection of a scenic view, the tradi-
tional health and safety rationales are not germane. Thus, a reviewing 
court must broadly interpret the general welfare prong of the ena-
bling legislation in order to accommodate a municipality's aesthetic 
goal.3! While the results have varied from state to state, there is a 
clear trend for courts to find aesthetic regulation solely for aesthetic 
purposes permissible under the general welfare prong.32 
Of course an aesthetic objective may be accomplished in conjunction with other legitimate 
police power objectives, or a legislature may choose to regulate solely to achieve aesthetic goals. 
27 The standard land-use treatises all contain thorough coverage of the issue. See ANDERSON, 
supra note 26, §§ 7.13-7.26; EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING, §§ 14-1 to 1~5 (4th ed. 1982) [hereinafter RATHKOPFJ; NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN 
LAND PLANNING LAW, §§ 11.01-11.19 (1974). 
28 See ANDERSON, supra note 26, § 7.13 ("[TJhe restatement of the objectives of the police 
power, found in nearly every zoning enabling act, includes four distinct purposes which properly 
may be served through zoning regulations.") The Supreme Court endorsed this principle as to 
zoning in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (key inquiry is whether 
regulation is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare"). State courts have reiterated this prescription. See, 
e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528, 536 (Ariz. 1985); Asselin v. Town of Conway, 
628 A.2d 247, 249 (N.H. 1993); Hopewell Township v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. 1982). 
29 "Morals" have little to do with zoning issues other than adult entertainment. See ANDER-
SON, supra note 26, § 7.13. 
30 A workable litmus test to detect harm purely aesthetic in nature was stated in J.J. 
Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 
223 (1955) ("While it is difficult to determine what is the primary offense of much land use, the 
simulation of blindness affords a simple rule-of-thumb: if a use is offensive to persons with sight 
but not offensive to a blind man in a similar position, the use is primarily offensive aestheti-
cally."). A regulation targeting such a use would have a primarily aesthetic purpose. See 
Michelman, supra note 26, at 36. 
31 The expansion of the concept of the general welfare is the subject of several commentaries, 
most notably, Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New 
General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603 (1981); see 
also Norman Williams, Scenic Protection as a Legitimate Goal of Public Regulation, 38 WASH. 
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1990). 
32 Tracking the majority position on this issue has become a cottage industry. See, e.g., 
RICHARD C. SMARDON & JAMES P. KARP, THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 25, 26-27 (1993) (thirty 
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To cope with changing judicial attitudes, local governments have 
employed a host of tools and tactics to protect the scenic landscape. 
The handiest tool is the traditional zoning power, which has long been 
crucial in prohibiting or restricting eyesores. Zoning is also useful for 
defining and protecting valuable resource areas such as viewsheds 
and view corridors. In addition to the zoning power, local govern-
ments have enacted general police power ordinances to prohibit or 
limit eyesores.33 Finally, and to a lesser extent, localities have made 
use of subdivision controls and environmental regulations to protect 
visual resources. The range of approaches employed in these ordi-
nances and regulations reflect the history of the debate over aesthetic 
purposes: landscape protection has evolved from a secondary purpose, 
barely countenanced under the police power, to a consistent theme in 
environmental protection. 
In jurisdictions adhering to what has come to be the minority 
position, aesthetics may not stand alone as a police power objective; 
localities must link protection of the visual resource to another, tradi-
tional goal of regulation. Section II of this Article discusses the pro-
tection of scenic resources as an ancillary objective, both before and 
after the Supreme Court's Berman decision. In majority position 
states, municipalities need not rely upon ancillary, traditional police 
power objectives to protect their visual resources; rather, municipali-
ties may advance aesthetic goals as the primary or sole purpose of 
regulation. Section III examines protection of visual resources in such 
majority view states. Section III also explores links between protec-
tion of the scenic landscape and the "general welfare" prong of the 
police power, in an attempt to offer some explanation for the majority 
states permit regulation for aesthetic purposes alone, five states do not, fifteen are undecided 
or have not considered the issue) (30/5/15). See generally Kenneth Regan, You Can't Build That 
Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1013 (1990) (20/26/5); Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority 
of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125 (1980) (16/16/9); Note, 
Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973) 
(14/23/14); Louis H. Massotti and Bruce 1. Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. 
URB. L. 773 (1969) (7/35/8). The major land-use treatises also review the debate. See RATHKOPF, 
supra note 27, § 14.02 (22 states allow aesthetic-based regulation standing alone); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 27, §§ 11.10-11.19 (validity of aesthetic-based regulation alone not the majority rule); 
ANDERSON, supra note 26, §§ 7.13-7.25 (validity of aesthetic-based regulation alone not the 
majority rule). The National Park Service has also weighed in on this issue. See NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE & NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRESERVATION LAW, PROPRIETY OF USING THE POLICE 
POWER FOR AESTHETIC REGULATION: A COMPREHENSIVE STATE-By-STATE ANALYSIS (1992). 
Even courts have gotten into the discussion. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 679-80 
(N.C. 1982) (citing Bufford article and updating the statistics based on its own research). 
33 See, e.g., Landmark Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1286--87 (Colo. 
1986) (en bane) (endorsing the use of zoning or "nonzoning" devices). For a discussion of 
Landmark, see infra notes 273-79. 
1995] SCENIC LANDSCAPE PROTECTION 703 
position's appreciation of our "most maligned" and "ignored" resource. 
Finally, Section IV suggests that protection of the visual resource is 
a defensible exercise of the police power. Local regulations may pro-
mote economic growth by enhancing tourism and preserving property 
values. Moreover, identification and protection of the scenic resource 
can help define valuable aspects of the community. 
II. SCENIC LANDSCAPE PROTECTION AS AN ANCILLARY PURPOSE 
A. Pre-Berman History 
In the pre-Berman era,34 regulations designed to promote aesthetic 
objectives were generally viewed with suspicion. This attitude was 
based on the belief that such regulations were inherently subjective. 
The courts' concern involved two concepts of due process embodied 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.35 First, substantive due process was 
denied where the preferences of an elite few would be imposed on the 
general public.36 The most famous expression of this view is undoubt-
edly that voiced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Youngstown v. Kahn 
Bros. Building CO.:37 
[M]ere aesthetic considerations cannot justify the use of the police 
power. It is commendable and desirable, but not essential to the 
public need, that our aesthetic desires be gratified. Moreover, ... 
the public view as to what is necessary for aesthetic progress 
greatly varies. Certain Legislatures might consider that it was 
more important to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, 
for posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for Keats.38 
Since aesthetic preferences stated in regulations could not be verified,39 
courts often characterized the regulations as expressions of mere 
opinion.40 Thus, ordinances promoting beauty could not constitute a 
legitimate exercise of the police power. 
34 See RATHKOPF, supra note 27, § 14.02[3] for a concise discussion of these "early and middle 
period" cases. See also ANDERSON, supra note 26, § 7.22; WILLIAMS, supra note 27, § 11.10. 
35 "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
36 For some thoughts on this aspect of the subjectivity issue, see Stephen F. Williams, Sub-
jectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1 
(1977). The article suggests that this problem has been overcome by various methods to verify 
aesthetic choices. See id. 
37 148 N.E. 842 (Ohio 1925). 
38 I d. at 844. 
39 See infra notes 159-75 and accompanying text (discussing potential resolution of the prob-
lem of verifiability of landscape preferences). 
40 See Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (Ill. 1932), in which the court asserted: 
It is generally recognized that aesthetic considerations, while not wholly without 
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The other consistently troubling aspect of aesthetic regulation in 
the pre-Berman era was the vagueness41 of regulatory standards, 
which may work a denial of procedural due process. Attempts to 
define "beauty" are inherently difficult;42 even where a community 
momentarily has reached a consensus as to an aesthetic preference, 
codification of the community's standards may prove elusive, if not 
impossible.43 As the Supreme Court has noted, "aesthetic judgments 
... defy[] objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully 
scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an 
impermissible purpose."44 Consequently, vagueness has been a consis-
tent stumbling block in regulation for aesthetic objectives.45 
weight, do not of themselves afford sufficient basis for the invasion of property rights, 
and this for the more or less obvious reason that while public health, safety, and morals, 
which make for public welfare, submit to reasonable definition and delimitation, the 
realm of the aesthetic varies with the wide variation of tastes and culture. 
ld. at 773. 
41 The "void for vagueness" doctrine is constitutional in nature: "Vague laws violate due 
process because individuals do not receive fair notice of the conduct proscribed by a statute, ... 
and because vague laws that do not limit the exercise of discretion by officials engender the 
possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Commonwealth v. Jaffe, 494 N.E.2d 
1342, 1345 (Mass. 1986) (quoting Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 
928 (Mass. 1983)). 
42 Professor Williams has termed this the "essential difficulty" of aesthetic regulation. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 27, § 11.02. 
43 Professor John J. Costonis, in his article, Land and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformu-
lation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355 (1982), argues that aesthetic regulations cannot 
meet the vagueness-due process requirement of intelligible standards when based on a rationale 
of aesthetics as "visual beauty." See, particularly, the discussion at 377-78 and 410-11. For some 
competing thoughts on the vagueness issue, see J. J. Dukeminier, supra note 30, at 225-28. 
44 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). Metromedia is notable in 
that the Court unanimously endorses the concept of regulation for aesthetic objectives by a 
municipality. Unlike Berman, which was founded in eminent domain, the ordinance in Metrome-
dia was an exercise of the police power. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493; Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. 
45 In Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. 1993), the Court of Appeals of 
Washington used procedural due process to reject an ordinance setting building design require-
ments: 
We note that an ordinary citizen reading these sections would learn only that a given 
building project should bear a good relationship with the Issaquah Valley and sur-
rounding mountains; its windows, doors, eaves and parapets should be of "appropriate 
proportions", its colors should be "harmonious" and seldom "bright" or "brilliant"; its 
mechanical equipment should be screened from public view; its exterior lighting should 
be "harmonious" with the building design and "monotony should be avoided." ... [W]e 
conclude that these code sections "do not give effective or meaningful guidance" to 
applicants, to design professionals, or to the public officials of Issaquah who are respon-
sible for enforcing the code. 
ld. at 751. See also Vanaman v. Town of Georgetown, 648 A.2d 426 (Del. 1994) (unpublished 
opinion) (ordinance addressing unregulated growth of weeds); City of Independence v. Richards, 
666 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (refuse accumulation ordinance); Village of Deshler v. Hoops, 
196 N.E.2d 476, 477-78 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Henry County 1963) (ordinance regulating eyesores); 
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Despite these problems, local legislatures routinely advanced pro-
tection of the scenic landscape as a secondary goal of land-use regu-
lation. In general, courts found aesthetic regulations permissible where 
the regulations also furthered an alternative, more traditional goal 
under the police power. The prevailing view was aptly summarized 
by Judge Pound in 1932: "Beauty may not be queen, but she is not an 
outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. She may at least 
shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or decency."46 
A leading case expressing the emergent judicial position is General 
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works.47 In this 
case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld restrictions 
that applied to outdoor advertising within the public view.48 The court 
rejected the claim that because the rules rested upon "aesthetic con-
siderations" they were void: "Grandeur and beauty of scenery con-
tribute highly important factors to the public welfare of a state. To 
preserve such landscape from defacement promotes the public wel-
fare and is a public purpose."49 The court endorsed the use of the police 
power to protect these aesthetic features.5o However, the court was 
not prepared to let an aesthetic purpose stand alone: 
The rules and regulations here in question have different aims. 
They do not rest primarily upon aesthetic considerations in the 
sense in which that phrase has been used to overturn legislative 
enactments. They are designed to promote safety of travel upon 
the highways, and enjoyment of resort to public parks and reser-
vations, to shield travellers upon highways from the unwelcome 
obtrusion of business appeals, to protect property from deprecia-
tion, and to make the commonwealth attractive to visitors from 
other states and countries as well as to her own citizens.51 
General Outdoor Advertising is a well-reasoned response to the limi-
tations of the doctrine requiring ancillary objectives for aesthetic 
regulations.52 
Orwell Township Supervisors v. Jewett, 571 A.2d 1100, 1101 (Pa. 1990) (junkyard and refuse 
ordinance). Cf City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798 (La. 1953). In Levy, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court reviewed a billboard ordinance designed to protect the "architectural and 
historical value" and the "quaint and distinctive character" of New Orleans' Vieux Carre section. 
The court was not persuaded in this instance: "Noone ... could possibly mistake the meaning 
of or be confused by the ordinance's references .... " 64 So. 2d at 800. 
46 Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (N.Y. 1932). 
47 193 N.E. 799 (Mass. 1935). 
48 ld. at 816. 
491d. 
WId. 
51 ld. at 815. 
52 One can quibble as to whether the 1935 Supreme Judicial Court viewed the billboard rules 
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On the other hand, the need for an alternative rationale resulted in 
a host of regulations designed to protect visual resources under the 
camouflage of health and safety rationales. The billboard regulations 
upheld in the classic case of St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City 
of St. Louis are generally acknowledged as the epitome of this genre.53 
The city's purported reasons for adopting its ordinance were protec-
tion of pedestrians and others upon the streets from injury in periods 
of high winds, prevention of fire hazards associated with billboards, 
and elimination of hiding places for criminals.54 The city produced little 
evidence to show a link between billboards and public health or safety. 
Nonetheless, the Missouri Supreme Court accepted these traditional 
rationales and, as a result, tolerated the ancillary objective of aes-
thetic enhancement. The court's ruling has won little but scorn from 
judges and commentators alike.55 Ultimately, however, the use of con-
trived alternative rationales helped pave the way for judicial recog-
nition of aesthetics, standing alone, as a legitimate police power ob-
jective. 
B. Post-Berman Developments 
In the post-Berman era, the nexus between aesthetic enhancement 
and an alternative rationale has remained important in those jurisdic-
tions that have not accepted the majority "aesthetics alone" position. 
In reviewing police power ordinances protecting visual resources, 
courts generally apply the "minimal scrutiny rational relationship 
test."56 This test is two-pronged. First, the government must show 
in question as primarily nonaesthetic in nature, and subordinate to the health and safety 
rationale. In hindsight, it is apparent that the regulations were chiefly designed to enhance 
scenic views; when billboard controls were again put before the same court, albeit 40 years later, 
the legislative purpose of a similar town bylaw was characterized as "primarily or solely for 
aesthetic reasons" and upheld. See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 
339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Mass. 1975). 
53 137 S.w. 929 (Mo. 1911). 
54 [d. at 938. 
55 See, e.g., City of Independence v. Richards, 666 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Westfield 
Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 324 A.2d 113, 118 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); 
RATHKOPF, supra note 27, § 14.02[3]; Costonis, supra note 43, at 374 n.52. 
56 The term is Justice Brennan's. See Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528 
n.7 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
This test must be distinguished from the stricter scrutiny applied in recent billboard cases 
involving First Amendment rights. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; ... " U.S. CONST. amend. 1. It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to discuss the relationship between protected speech and billboards. 
See infra note 61. 
In the decisions discussed in this section, the First Amendment was not an issue. Nonetheless, 
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that the regulation bears a substantial relationship to the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.57 In minority 
position states, where aesthetic purposes cannot stand alone, the link 
between aesthetics and health or safety constitutes a necessary ele-
ment in the protection oflandscape aesthetics. Some state courts have 
taken an alternative approach, expanding their interpretation of the 
a brief summary of recent developments is helpful. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 
453 U.S. 490 (1981), a divided Supreme Court reviewed the city's ordinance prohibiting outdoor 
advertising display signs. The stated goals of the ordinance were "to preserve and improve the 
appearance of the City," and "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about 
by distracting sign displays." Id. at 493. The Court quickly endorsed these purposes as legiti-
mate police power objectives. Id. at 507-08. This aspect of the holding was later reaffirmed in 
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
807 (1984). 
However, the ordinance had the effect of restricting commercial speech protected by the First 
Amendment. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509. Under the test announced by the Court in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Health Service Commission of New York, a regulation 
that restricts such speech must also "directly advance" the announced governmental objectives. 
447 U.S. 577, 566 (1980). This provided an opening for challenge. The sign companies asserted 
that the record was inadequate to show any connection between billboards and traffic safety. 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509. At stake was the sufficiency of evidence necessary to demonstrate 
the connection between billboards and traffic safety. Id. 
For the plurality in Metromedia, relying heavily on the decision of the California Supreme 
Court, the advancement of traffic safety was self-evident. Id. The California Supreme Court 
noted that the record was meager on this point. Id. Nevertheless, the California court ruled 
that "as a matter of law" an ordinance eliminating billboards designed to be viewed from public 
ways reasonably relates to traffic safety. I d. Billboards are intended to divert a driver's attention 
from the roadway. Under the circumstances, the safety argument was proven: "We ... hesitate 
to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many 
reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety. There is 
nothing here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable." Id. In essence, the Court 
placed the burden of proof on the challenger to show that the asserted connection was "palpably 
false." Id. (citing Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949)). 
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, was not satisfied with the sufficiency of the 
evidence connecting billboards with traffic safety. He pointed out two important aspects of this 
issue. First, "[n]ot 1 of the 11 cases cited by the plurality ... stands for the proposition that 
'billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety.'" Metromedia, at 528, n.7 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). More telling, these eleven cases "merely applied the minimal scrutiny rational 
relationship test," which grants greater deference to legislative determinations. Id. Moreover, 
some of the decisions linking safety to billboards are suspect because of the requirements in 
minority position states, which have been widely manipulated since St. Louis Gunning. Id. 
(citing St. Louis Gunning, 137 S.w. at 929). 
Justice Brennan's concurrence has inspired several courts exploring billboard limitations 
within the context of the First Amendment to hone in on the asserted link to traffic safety. See 
City of Chicago v. Gordon, 497 N.E.2d 442, 446-47 (Ill. 1986); Bell v. Township of Stafford, 541 
A.2d 692, 699 (N.J. 1988); Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1057 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
Brennan's opinion has not, however, inspired courts applying the minimal scrutiny rational 
relationship test to reexamine the link between billboards and traffic safety. The legislative 
determination still retains its presumption of validity where the First Amendment is not 
invoked by the challenger. 
57 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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general welfare prong to include new public purposes. In particular, 
the preservation of property values and the promotion of tourism 
have provided local governments with additional options for protec-
tion of the scenic landscape. 
Second, courts applying the minimal scrutiny, rational relationship 
test balance the public benefits obtained through use of the police power 
against the harm caused to the individual challenging the ordinance.58 
In some jurisdictions, the courts have expressed the expectation that 
government will employ ''less restrictive means," where available, to effect 
its goalS.59 Consequently, a clearly permissible objective may be viola-
tive of substantive due process where the methods chosen by the local 
government are arbitrary or capricious, or unduly restrictive.60 
C. Recent Developments 
This section examines recent cases in which minority view courts 
have reviewed police power ordinances to protect visual resources. 
The alternative rationales validated by these courts have been en-
tirely predictable: enhancement of public health and safety, protection 
of property values, and promotion of tourism have served as ancillary 
objectives. Each alternative rationale is explored in turn. 
1. Health/Safety Nexus 
In minority view states, a nexus to health or safety continues to be 
the chief underpinning for scenic view protection. Typically, courts 
have had occasion to validate this connection in the context of judicial 
review of eyesore regulations. The most common targets of these 
regulations are billboards61 and junkyards62 deemed offensive to sce-
nic views from publicly accessible locations. 
58 See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring) (government must advance a 
sufficiently substantial purpose to justify ban on billboards). 
59 See, e.g., Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa. 1982). 
60 Id. at 1341. The same is true where the legitimate objective nonetheless results in a total 
deprivation of all economically viable use. See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing 57 Ranch v. City of Yuma, 731 P.2d 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986». 
61 Billboard and sign cases have been collected in RATHKoPF, supra note 27, § 14.02[4] at nn. 
81 & 84. For the leading law review articles on billboard control, see id. § 14.01 at nA. 
62 See, e.g., Chorzempa v. City of Huntsville, 643 So. 2d 1021, ·1024 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) 
(upholding ordinance banning storage of junk); Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Ark. 
1962) (holding automobile junkyard cannot be prevented solely upon aesthetic basis); People v. 
Sevel, 261 P.2d 359, 361 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953) (upholding ordinance regulating 
junkyards and auto wrecking establishments); Board of County Comm'rs of the County of 
Boulder v. Thompson, 493 P.2d 1358, 1361-62 (Colo. 1972) (en banc) (upholding zoning provision 
barring automobile junkyard); Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 181~2 (Conn. 
1944) (upholding ordinance affecting billboards); Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 
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For example, in Pate v. City Council of Tuscaloosa, a zoning ordi-
nance restricting off-site billboards-billboards not located on the 
property they advertise-was upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals 
of Alabama.63 The ordinance stated a primary purpose of traffic safety.64 
At trial, the city's planner and traffic engineer defended the safety 
nexus. The planner stated that "motorists, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, tend to take their eyes off traffic lights in an effort to 
see billboards."65 According to the city engineer, "motorists can only 
process so much information as they drive, and other information 
which is unrelated to the operation of the vehicle can cause distrac-
tions, possibly reducing traffic safety."66 
782,785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (upholding regulation of junkyard on aesthetic basis alone); 
Rockdale County v. Mitchell's Used Auto Parts, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. 1979) (upholding 
ordinance regulating junkyards); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709, 711-12 (Ky. 1964) 
(upholding state's Junk Yard Act for a variety of reasons, including aesthetics); City of Shreve-
port v. Brock, 89 So. 2d 156, 158 (La. 1956) (upholding ordinance requiring fencing in of 
automobile junkyard); Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of the City of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90, 
98-101 (Me. 1973) (upholding statute regulating junkyards in part); Shifflett v. Baltimore 
County, 230 A.2d 310, 315-16 (Md. 1967) (upholding ordinance requiring amortization of none on-
forming junkyard); National Used Cars, Inc. v. City of Kalamazoo, 233 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1975) (upholding ordinance requiring shielding of junkyards on aesthetic grounds alone); 
City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo. 1948) (upholding ordinance prohibiting 
junkyards in certain districts); State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977) (upholding 
statute requiring shielding of junkyards on aesthetic grounds); Village of Brady v. Melcher, 502 
N.W.2d 458, 462 (Neb. 1993) (upholding local ordinance regulating junkyards); People v. Scott, 
258 N.E.2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 1970) (upholding junkyard regulation); State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 
(N.C. 1982) (upholding county ordinance regulating junkyards on aesthetic grounds alone); State 
v. Buckley, 243 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Ohio 1968), (upholding statute requiring junkyard screening valid) 
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 163, 171 (1969); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (Ore. 1965) (en 
bane) (upholding zoning provision prohibiting auto wrecking yard from light industrial district 
on aesthetic grounds alone); Cox v. Township of New Sewickley, 284 A.2d 829, 833-34 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1971) (upholding ordinance limiting junkyards); State v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d 474, 477 
(Tenn. 1981) (upholding statute limiting junkyards on aesthetic and other grounds); City of 
Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (upholding 
ordinance regulating junkyards on aesthetic and other grounds); Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292, 
294-95 (Utah 1975) (finding junkyard may be regulated by county ordinance on aesthetic 
grounds); Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Vt. 1990) (upholding zoning 
ordinance limiting junkyards for aesthetic reasons); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 388 P.2d 926, 934-35 
(Wash. 1964) (en bane) (upholding ordinance limiting junkyards on aesthetic and other grounds); 
Farley v. Graney, 119 S.E.2d 833, 848 (W. Va. 1960) (upholding statute requiring the obstruction 
of highway travellers' views of junkyards); Racine County v. Plourde, 157 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 
(Wis. 1968) (upholding regulation of junkyards based on aesthetics alone). 
63 622 So. 2d 405 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). 
64 The ordinance was enacted "to protect the safety and efficiency of the City's transportation 
network by reducing the confusion and distraction to motorists, reducing collision hazards and 
enhancing the motorists' ability to see pedestrians, obstacles, other vehicles and traffic sigus." 
[d. at 407 (quoting ALA. CODE 1975 § 11-52-70). 
65 [d. at 408. 
66 [d. 
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The challenger, who was in the business of maintaining off-site 
billboards, asserted that this claim was "merely a 'smoke screen' used 
to veil the City's aesthetic pursuits."67 The court rejected this claim: 
''Without addressing the propriety or impropriety of aesthetics as a 
purpose for zoning regulation by municipalities in Alabama, we hold 
that there is ample evidence regarding traffic safety concerns [to 
affirm the city's enforcement actionJ."68 
The Arizona Supreme Court,69 in Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of 
Mesa, upheld a regulation on similar grounds.70 The municipal zoning 
ordinance at issue restricted off-site billboards in order to "reduce 
advertising distractions, which may contribute to traffic accidents," 
and to "provide an improved visual environment for the citizens of 
and visitors to the City."7l The court was satis~ed with the nexus to 
traffic safety: "We do not doubt that off-site billboards pose a sig-
nificant threat to public safety and the general welfare. The sole 
purpose of such a structure is to occupy land and air space as con-
spicuously as possible to 'divert a driver's attention from the road-
way."'72 Pate and Outdoor Systems suggest that courts will defer to a 
municipality's assertion that there is a connection between billboards 
and traffic safety, even in the absence of detailed evidence.73 
Interestingly, billboard ordinances in states purportedly in the ma-
jority camp also continue to cite the link between aesthetic objectives 
and safety. For example, in Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined an ordinance relating 
to windblown signs and blimps.74 The ordinance's stated purposes 
were the promotion of traffic safety and fire protection.75 The car 
dealer who challenged the ordinance claimed that the ordinance pro-
moted primarily aesthetic objectives.76 The court accepted this con-
clusion but upheld the measure: "A fortiori, when other worthwhile 
objectives are also realized, for example, improvement of traffic safety 
67 [d. 
68 [d. 
69 Arizona is firmly within the minority camp. See SMARDON & KARP, supra note 32, at 26. 
70 819 P.2d 44, 53 (Ariz. 1991). 
71 [d. at 49. 
72 [d. (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.3d 848, 859 (1980). The court 
ignored Justice Brennan's concerns with this link. See supra note 56. 
73 See Pate v. City Council of Thscaloosa, 622 So. 2d 405, 410 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); Outdoor 
Systems, 819 P.2d at 49; see also Art Van Furniture Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 437 N.W.2d 380, 
384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
74 306 S.E.2d 192, 193-95 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
75 [d. at 194. 
76 This claim came despite the fact that aesthetic purposes, standing alone, had been endorsed 
by the state's supreme court one year earlier in State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (N.C. 1982). 
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and the protection of property values, the challenged regulation will 
be deemed to be within the range of permissible purposes properly 
achieved through use of the police power."77 
Courts also have upheld ordinances restricting other types of eye-
sores where a nexus between aesthetic goals and public safety exists. 
For example, in Village of Brady v. Melcher, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court reviewed an ordinance that deemed wrecked or junked vehicles 
a nuisance and authorized abatement after a thirty-day period.78 The 
court characterized the measure as an ordinance to "define, regulate, 
suppress and prevent nuisance[]" and held that the restrictions "pro-
tect the public health and welfare."79 The obvious enhancement of the 
village's visual character was a secondary benefit.80 Courts have also 
had occasion to cite the health or safety rationale while upholding 
regulations addressed to such varied eyesores as antennae and tow-
ers,8! litter and debris,82 recreational83 and business84 vehicles, and 
mobile homes.85 
77 Goodman Toyota, 306 S.E.2d at 194; see also City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 836 S.W.2d 863 
(Ark. 1992); Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982). 
78 502 N.W.2d 458 (Neb. 1993). 
79 [d. at 462. 
80 See Chorzempa v. City of Huntsville, 643 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (ordinance 
banning storage of junk bears substantial relationship to public health and is not vague). 
81 See, e.g., Schroeder v. Municipal Court of Los Cerritos, 141 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977) (upholding ordinance limiting radio or television antenna over 40 feet in height); Gouge v. 
City of Snellville, 287 S.E.2d 539, 543 (Ga. 1982) (upholding ordinance prohibiting satellite dish 
antenna in front yard); State ex rel. Columbia Tower v. Boone County, 829 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding denial of conditional use permit for 620 foot communication tower on 
aesthetic basis). But see Nationwide Satellite Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Haddon 
Heights, 578 A.2d 389, 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding satellite dish antenna 
ordinance must yield to federal power); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield 
Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 590-93 (Pa. 1973) (holding 307-foot tower not proscribed by statute). 
82 See, e.g., City of Lebanon v. McClure, 541 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (upholding 
municipal code provision addressing unsightly blight and deterioration). But see Town of Geor-
getown v. Vanaman, 648 A.2d 426 (Del. 1994) (holding ordinance addressing "unregulated 
growth" of weeds void for vagueness); Village of Deshler v. Hoops, 196 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Ohio 
1963) (holding ordinance regulating eyesores void for vagueness). 
83 See, e.g., City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261, 263---u4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) 
(upholding ordinance banning storage of recreational vehicle on the basis of neighborhood 
aesthetics); Johnson v. Village of Morton, 352 N.E.2d 456, 457-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (upholding 
zoning provision barring parking of campers in residence district on various grounds); Recrea-
tional Vehicle United Citizens Ass'n v. City of Sterling Heights, 418 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1987) (upholding ordinance banning parking of various recreational vehicles in residential 
area for aesthetic and other reasons). 
84 See, e.g., People v. Tolman, 168 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980) 
(upholding zoning provision limiting business vehicle parking in residence district); Warren v. 
City of Marietta, 288 S.E.2d 562, 564 (Ga. 1982) (upholding ordinance banning parking of 
business vehicles on aesthetic grounds). 
85 See, e.g., City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 685 P.2d 821, passim (Idaho 1984) (upholding 
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2. Critical Resource Protection Districts 
Health and safety rationales are also available where visual re-
source protection is achieved in conjunction with protection of other 
aspects of a critical resource area. Scenic areas generally overlap 
traditional natural resource areas. This overlap promotes an easy 
alliance between aesthetic and environmental protection. For exam-
ple, regulations limiting development within flood plains or wetlands 
have the primary purpose of public health or safety; they also secon-
darily protect the scenic aspects of the resource area. 
The nexus between protection of natural and scenic resources has 
proven useful regardless of a state's position on the "aesthetics alone" 
question. For example, in Town of Freeport v. Brickyard Cove Asso-
ciates, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine86 upheld the town's zoning 
provision establishing a Resource Protection District.87 The district 
was designed to limit development on the town's shoreline: 
It is the intent ofthis District to protect the most fragile shoreline 
and natural areas, including flood plains, critical aquifer recharge 
areas and fresh and salt water wetlands, in which development 
would lower the water quality, significantly disturb essential natural 
plant and animal relationships, or general scenic and natural val-
ues, and to discourage development in unsafe or unhealthy areas.88 
The defendant was charged with a zoning violation after clearcutting 
a waterfront parcel.89 The town's chief concern was the defendant's 
failure to employ erosion-control measures,90 which were required by 
the performance standards of the bylaw. However, the clearcutting 
ordinance banning mobile homes in farm zone on various grounds, including aesthetics); Warren 
v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624, 628-30 (Me. 1980) (upholding zoning provision 
banning modular homes on aesthetic and other bases); State v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Mo. 
1971) (upholding ordinance banning mobile homes in residence district); Suddell v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 327 N.E.2d 809, 811 (N.Y. 1975) (upholding zoning provision limiting location of 
mobile homes); City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 371 N.E.2d 579, 587--88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) 
(upholding ordinance limiting house trailers based, in part, on aesthetics); Mobile Home City of 
Chattanooga v. Hamilton County, 552 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding mobile 
home limitations). But see Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 489 A.2d 600, 604~5 (N.H. 1985) 
(rejecting zoning regulation limiting mobile homes to certain locations); White v. Union County, 
377 S.E.2d 93, 95-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (challenging county zoning regulation setting stand-
ards for mobile home use). 
86 Maine is in the majority camp. See SMARDON & KARP, supra note 32, at 26. 
87 594 A.2d 556, 558 (Me. 1991). 
88 Id. 
89 The bylaw permitted "timber harvesting," which required a "well-distributed stand of 
trees" to be left intact after cutting. I d. 
90 Id. at 559. The silt from the site had entered off-shore mussel beds, which caught the 
attention of the town's shellfish warden. Id. at 557. 
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also opened a "hole" in the forest canopy larger than the 7,500 square 
feet permitted under the bylaw.91 The town's concern for shoreline 
views, although of secondary importance in this matter, clearly was 
addressed by its multi-purpose bylaw. 
Scenic views have similarly been enhanced by districts designed to 
protect wetlands,92 flood plains,93 aquifers,94 watersheds,95 steep slopes,96 
and shorelines97 primarily on the grounds of public health or safety. 
Even districts only peripherally associated with these traditional po-
lice power objectives have promoted view protection as an ancillary 
purpose. Foremost in this category are agricultural protection dis-
tricts. In Kentview Properties, Inc. v. City of Kent, the Court of 
Appeals of Washington upheld a zone change that placed certain lands 
into an agricultural district.98 The court cited the farmland protection 
element of the city's comprehensive plan: 
Farmlands are important to the local economy .... The value of 
farmlands, however, goes beyond economic considerations. Farm-
lands play an important role in the protection of fragile natural 
environments such as wetlands and streams, and contribute to 
certain wildlife habitat needs. In addition, farmlands function as 
a valuable scenic and open space resource .... 99 
On similar reasoning, districts designed to protect forests lOO and other 
locally sensitive areas101 have worked to preserve scenic views. 
91 ld. at 559. 
92 See, e.g., id. at 558; 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 737 P.2d 
607, 609 (Or. 1987). 
93 See, e.g, Town of Freeport, 594 A.2d at 558; Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 
passim (Wis. 1972). 
94 See, e.g., Town of Freeport, 594 A.2d at 558; 1000 Friends of Oregon, 737 P.2d at 609. 
95 See, e.g., 1000 Friends of Oregon, 737 P.2d at 607. 
96 See, e.g., Beacon Hill Farm Assocs. II Ltd. Partnership v. Loudoun County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 875 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1989) (remanding facial challenge to ordinance with purposes 
including preservation of significant natural resource areas and proper development on slopes). 
97 See, e.g., McNulty v. Town ofIndialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Just, 201 N.W.2d 
at 761 (lakefront). 
98 795 P.2d 732, 736 (Wash. App. 1990); see also Waker Assocs., Inc. v. Clackamas County, 826 
P.2d 20, 22-23 (Or. App. 1992) (affirming reversal of permit denial that had been based on conflict 
with agricultural preservation goal); Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981) 
(upholding zoning ordinance provision favoring those engaged in agriculture); Board of Super-
visors of Fauquier County v. Machnick, 410 S.E.2d 607, 609 (Va. 1991) (upholding decision 
applying 85% open space requirement to all subdivisions in rural agricultural district). 
99 Kentview Properties, 795 P.2d at 736. 
100 See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608 (Or. 1993)(reviewing permit denials for 
construction in forest zone); 1000 Friends of Oregon, 737 P.2d at 607. 
101 See, e.g., 1000 Friends of Oregon, 737 P.2d at 607. 
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3. Protection of Property Values 
Localities in minority position states have used an expanded view 
of the general welfare prong to serve as the legal basis for regulation 
of visual resources. In particular, courts in these jurisdictions have 
endorsed the preservation of property values as a legitimate police 
power purpose. The property value rationale provides an additional 
nexus where aesthetic regulation cannot stand alone. 
The link between aesthetic regulation and property values was 
endorsed in Chorzempa v. City of Huntsville. 102 The municipal junk-
yard ordinance at issue in the case was designed, in part, to prevent 
unsightliness and the aggravation of urban blight. loa The Alabama 
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the ordinance based on the link to 
property values: 
Current authorities recognize neighborhood aesthetics to be inte-
grally bound to property values and to be relevant considerations 
in zoning when they bear in a substantial way upon land utiliza-
tion .... We hold ... : "It is apparent that the statutory grant of 
police powers to municipalities encompasses the authority to en-
act regulatory ordinances for the protection and preservation of 
property values affecting the general welfare of the community."l04 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Columbia Tower, Inc. v. Boone County/05 the 
Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a conditional use 
permit for construction of a 620-foot communications towerYl6 The 
102 643 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Ct. App. 1993). 
103 [d. at 1022. 
104 [d. at 1024 (quoting Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 205 A.2d 65, 67 (N..T. Super. 1964». 
105 829 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App. 1992). Missouri is in the majority camp. Several other majority 
states have embraced the rationale of property values. See, e.g., City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 
685 P.2d 821, 824-25 (Idaho 1984); City of Independence v. Richards, 666 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. App. 
1983); Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ohio 1984); City of Kettering v. 
Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 525 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ohio App. 1987). 
106 829 S.W.2d at 535. In Columbia 7bwer, a local adjudicatory decision rather than the 
constitutionality of a local regulation is under review. Other courts have also sustained local 
adjudicatory decisions based on impacts to scenic resources. See Pacifica Homeowners' Ass'n v. 
Wesley Palms Retirement Community, 224 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-84 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986) 
(holding conditional use permit not violated when trees grow so as to obstruct ocean views); 
Sharrett v. Campbell, 440 N.E.2d 167, 172-73 (Ill. App. 1982) (despite impacts on view, land-
owners equitably estopped from demanding removal of building); Boyle v. Kosciusko County, 
565 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (denial of variance affirmed where proposed changes 
impact views); Forester v. City of Westbrook, 604 A.2d 31, 32 (Me. 1992) (impact on views 
sufficient injury for standing purposes); Burbridge v. Mine Hill Township, 568 A.2d 527, 535-36 
(N..T. 1990) (upholding variance where auto junkyard's appearance will be improved). Cf Conley 
v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 353 N.E.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. 1976) (award of 
variance upheld despite impacts to views); Drulard v. LeTourneau, 593 P2d 1118, 1123-24 (Or. 
1979) (despite impacts on view, house within height limitation); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge 
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criteria to be considered in the permitting process included the pub-
lic's "comfort" and "general welfare," impacts on property in the 
immediate vicinity, and diminution of property values.107 At the ad-
ministrative hearing, abutting landowners presented evidence to the 
county commission concerning the visual impact of the tower upon 
surrounding property.108 The court noted that such aesthetic consid-
erations "are appropriate in zoning matters."109 However, the court 
sustained the permit denial, chiefly because the aesthetic impacts 
were "inextricably intertwined with property values."llo 
Beverly A. Rowlett111 has argued quite persuasively that the "newly 
discovered and much relied-on property values justification is merely 
derived from that old pariah, aesthetics."1l2 In reviewing decisions 
through 1981, she noted: 
In most cases it is probably true that aesthetic considerations and 
economics are "inextricably intertwined." Nevertheless, uphold-
ing the validity of a primarily aesthetic regulation on the ground 
that it will tend to protect property values, while asserting that 
aesthetics alone is an insufficient ground, is misleading. Property 
values will clearly not be enhanced by a regulation with no basis 
in health, safety, or morals unless beauty, as perceived by prospec-
tive purchasers, is enhanced by the regulation.1l3 
In this view, the property values rationale is but the latest in a series 
of ruses, in line with the regulations and decision in St. Louis Gun-
ning, designed to camouflage the aesthetic purposes behind a local 
regulation.1l4 
No recent case bears this view out more than Coscan Washington, 
Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission, 
in which the "inextricable" link between landscape aesthetics and 
property values was granted considerable deference.1l5 In this case, 
Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Or. App. 1993) (subdivision denied, in part, because of impacts to 
view). 
107 See Columbia Tower, 829 S.W.2d at 536. 
108 [d. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
111 Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General 
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603 (1981). 
112 [d. at 622. 
113 [d. at 623. 
114 Rowlett comments that "a major shortcoming of the cases that uphold regulations on these 
grounds is that usually little, if any, objective evidence exists of the regulation's impact on 
property values." [d. at 624. She attributes this to two factors: "the presumption of constitu-
tionality, and the difficulty of obtaining objective evidence on such speculative matters." [d. 
115 590 A.2d 1080 (Md. App. 1991). 
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the county planning board was empowered to consider in its subdivi-
sion review "sites, structures, areas, or settings of archeological, his-
torical, architectural, cultural, or scenic value or significance."116 The 
underlying controversy arose when the board approved a residential 
subdivision plan but attached conditions requiring the use of specific 
building materials.ll7 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected the county's con-
tention that the conditions were valid even if they were devised solely 
to promote an aesthetic purpose. In Maryland, the court noted, this 
position is anathema.118 Instead, the court upheld the conditions on 
several alternative grounds. The conditions would, according to the 
testimony of the commission, improve the quality of the county's 
housing stock.119 This constituted an enhancement of property val-
ues.120 Also crucial for the court was the benefit to the scenic area 
adjacent to the proposed subdivision, which was rolling farmland with 
"a little narrow one-lane country road with tall oak trees on each 
side."121 
Without much comment, the court salvaged the county's decision 
by piggybacking one aesthetic objective-limitations on the use of 
vinyl siding-on another-preservation of scenic views-and by cit-
ing a rather weak nexus to enhanced property values. Unless one 
attaches paramount importance to the economic benefits of the board's 
permit conditions, it seems inescapable that the conditions were im-
posed for purposes patently and primarily aesthetic. 
4. Promotion of Tourism 
Local regulations to protect visual resources have been upheld 
based on a nexus to the promotion of tourism. In minority position 
states, the benefit to tourism provides the necessary rationale under 
the general welfare prong of the police power.122 Rowlett has similar 
qualms regarding this approach: 
116Id. at 1086. 
117 The county mandated that 60% of the homes be constructed of brick, wood, stone, or stucco. 
Homes sided with aluminum or vinyl were to be kept distant from a neighboring historic 
location. The developer protested this condition. Id. at 1085. 
118 The court sternly advised that it had no intention of modernizing its position: "To accept 
this argument would, in effect, validate all governmental attempts to regulate aesthetics as 
legitimate regulations for the general welfare. This would overrule [City of Baltimore v. Mano 
Swartz, 299 A.2d 828 (Md. App. 1973)] and a long line of cases." Id. at 1087. 
119 This, in turn, would enhance the "image of the County as a good place to live and work," 
and assure "sound economic development and the expansion of the tax base." Id. at 1089. 
120Id. at 1085 n.5. 
121Id. at 1089. 
122 See, e.g., Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The 
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Since logically tourism is promoted by a regulation only because 
the regulation fosters beauty, it is apparent that this economic 
general welfare justification is as much derived from aesthetics as 
is the property values justification. If the supposedly tourism-pro-
moting regulation cannot reasonably be said to be based on health, 
safety, or morals, then the real issue in these cases is whether 
aesthetics alone is a proper basis for regulation-an issue that the 
courts pretend is not present .... Instead, the courts indulge in 
syllogistic reasoning that could no doubt be repeated convincingly 
by almost any court in any jurisdiction in the United States: the 
tourist industry is important to this area; tourists come to enjoy 
our visually pleasing environment; this regulation enhances that 
environment; therefore it promotes tourism.l23 
717 
Notwithstanding the accuracy of Rowlett's observations regarding 
the aesthetic basis of the tourism rationale, courts repeatedly cite 
promotion of tourism as a primary or secondary purpose of local 
regulations to protect the scenic landscape. For example, in Donrey 
Communications Co. v. City of Fayetteville, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas cited with approval the tourism goals of an ordinance that 
restricted billboards.l24 In adopting the measure, the city board of 
directors found that "a large and increasing number of tourists have 
been visiting the [c]ity ... , and as a result the tourist industry is a 
direct source of income for citizens of [the] city, with an increasing 
number of persons directly or indirectly dependent upon the tourist 
industry for their livelihood."125 The court ruled that the ordinance 
"directly advances the legitimate governmental interests in traffic 
safety, the aesthetic landscape and the tourism industry."126 Courts in 
Maine,127 Florida,128 and North Carolinal29 have similarly endorsed this 
decision came before Florida adopted its present stance following the majority "aesthetics 
alone" position. In Rotenberg the District Court of Appeal of Florida upheld the city's zoning 
provision calling for the screening of junkyards. The court held that aesthetics constituted a 
valid basis for zoning in Florida and linked this to the city's "attraction to tourists." Id. at 785-86. 
Other minority camp decisions endorse the connection between tourism and landscape aesthet-
ics. See Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Roberts Enter., Inc., 304 So. 2d 637, 640 (Miss. 
1974) (state's natural beauty "attract[s] thousands of visitors annually"); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (N.H. 1961) ("[T]he general welfare of the State is enhanced when 
tourist business is good."). Both states have now embraced the majority position. 
128 Rowlett, supra note 111, at 634. 
124 660 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1983). 
125 Id. at 903. 
128 Id. In reaching its conclusions the court cited Metrornedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 
508-11 (1981), discussed supra notes 44, 56, and accompanying text. Id. 
127 See John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (D. Me. 1978). 
128 See Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So. 2d 1312, 1315 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1982). 
129 See R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294 S.E.2d 388, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
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connection. Thus, despite their insistence on an alternative rationale, 
courts in the minority camp have demonstrated considerable toler-
ance for protection of the visual resource. The restriction of eyesores, 
protection of scenic areas, and use of aesthetic criteria in adjudicatory 
decisionmaking are all permissible local regulatory devices in these 
jurisdictions. As seen in Coscan Washington and similar decisions, 
minority position courts tend to loosely apply the requirement that 
aesthetic regulations be tied to an alternative rationale. In contrast, 
courts in the majority camp have addressed questions concerning the 
legitimacy of scenic protection more directly. 
III. LANDSCAPE PROTECTION AS A PRIMARY OR SOLE PURPOSE 
A. The Absence of an Articulated Rationale for Landscape 
Protection 
As noted in Section I, aesthetic goals have been accepted in a 
majority of jurisdictions as a legitimate exercise of the police power, 
even when standing alone.13o Without much fanfare, courts in these 
states have found that ordinances that seek "to protect the unique 
aesthetics" of an area131 or promote "the preservation or enhancement 
of the visual environment"l32 promote objectives sufficiently related 
to the general welfare to fit within that prong of the police power. As 
these courts have made clear, judicial support for legislation promot-
ing aesthetic objectives does not depend on the presence of ancillary 
purposes, whether the protection of health or safety, the preservation 
of property values, or the promotion of tourism.l33 
But on what reasoning? Why is "beauty," whether found in the 
landscape or in architecture, a worthy goal of government regulation? 
In endorsing the use of the police power to accomplish purely aes-
thetic goals, rarely does a reviewing court express its understanding 
of the nexus between aesthetics and the general welfare. Of course, 
courts embracing the pursuit of aesthetic goals sometimes acknow-
ledge that beauty is preferable to blight. 1M But such statements hardly 
address those fundamental due process questions regarding the ex-
130 See supra notes 3~2 and accompanying text. 
131 See Thwn of Hilton Head v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 397 S.E.2d 662, 664 (S.C. Super Ct. 1990). 
132 See Thwn of Conway v. Cardiff & Co., 628 A.2d 247, 250 (N.H. 1993). 
133 See infra section III.D. 
134 See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 592 P.2d 728, 748, (Cal. 1979), reversed, 610 
P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), in which the court's analysis consists of a quote from Ogden Nash: 
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istence of cognizable public benefits of aesthetic regulation aptly sum-
marized in Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Building CO.135 
If there exists a rationale that supports aesthetic goals in landscape 
protection, then Justice Douglas's intuitive statement in Berman v. 
Parker-that the values representing the public welfare "are spiri-
tual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary"136-will have 
turned out to be quite prescient. By equating spirituality and aesthet-
ics, Justice Douglas anticipated work performed in a host of disci-
plines-including philosophy, psychology, geography, economics, re-
gional planning, and landscape architecture-exploring the concept of 
landscape aesthetics. These disciplines have contributed greatly to 
our understanding of the role of the scenic resource in promoting the 
general welfare. 
B. Visual Resources and the General Welfare 
The chief contribution of the academic discussion of landscape aes-
thetics is acknowledgement of the scenic landscape as a valuable 
resource, much like the air or water resources already protected by 
regulation. In the landscape aestheticists' view, 
the landscape is more than a passive backdrop. It is the stage on 
which we move. The events of life take place somewhere and that 
"whereness" affects the perception of the event. The visual land-
scape, the environment we see, gives shape to our character. The 
objects and forms in that landscape influence our actions, guide 
our choices, affect our values, restrict or enhance our freedom, 
determine where and with what quality we will mix with each 
other. The perceived landscape molds our dreams, locates our 
fantasies and in some mysterious way even predicts our future. 137 
This conception of the scenic resource is obviously at odds with the 
sentiments expressed in Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Building CO.I38 
There, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "[m]ere aesthetic consid-
erations [are] commendable and desirable, but not essential to the 
I think that I shall never see 
A billboard lovely as a tree. 
Indeed, unless the billboards fall, 
I'll never see a tree at all. 
This limerick is also cited approvingly in Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 306 S.E.2d 
192, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (billboard regulation upheld). 
135 See infra notes 138--39 and accompanying test; see also infra note 159 and accompanying 
text. 
136 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
137 Gussow, supra note 1, at 7. 
138 148 N.E. 842 (Ohio 1925). 
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public need .... "139 The study of landscape aesthetics, on the other 
hand, links aesthetic goals to the general welfare by emphasizing the 
crucial role of visual resources in various aspects of daily life.140 
Indeed, it can be argued that reverence for the landscape has 
always been an essential component of the American psyche.141 Pas-
toralism-exaltation of the beauty and simplicity of rural life-has 
been a recurring cultural theme throughout our history.142 As Peter 
G. Rowe argues in his recent work Making a Middle Landscape,143 
the pastoral theme can be traced to Ralph Waldo Emersonl44 and 
139 [d. at 842. 
140 See, e.g., D.W. Meinig, The Beholding Eye-Ten Versions of the Same Scene, 66 LAND-
SCAPE ARCHITECTURE 47 (1976). The author suggests that ten persons viewing the same 
landscape might avoid "the technical thickets of optics, psychology, epistemology, or culture to 
converse intelligently about the topic," which is "far too fascinating and important to be left 
fragmented and obscured in the jargon of such specialists." [d. at 47. The author then goes on 
to review the various ways the members of the group might describe the same scene: landscape 
as nature, habitat, artifact, system, problem, wealth, ideology, history, place, and aesthetic. [d. 
at 47-54. 
141 Reverence for the landscape may in fact be an essential part of the human condition. 
Edward O. Wilson and others have suggested that the roots of landscape aesthetics may be 
evolutionary in nature. See generally EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA (1984). This "biophilia 
hypothesis" asserts that our affinity with nature may be genetic in origin: 
[TJhe basic proposition is that certain rewards or advantages associated with natural 
settings during evolution were so critical for survival as to favor the selection of 
individuals with a disposition to acquire, and then retain, various adaptive positive/ap-
proach responses to unthreatening natural configurations and elements. From this it 
follows that as a remnant of evolution, modern humans might have a biologically 
prepared readiness to learn and persistently retain certain positive responses to nature 
but reveal no such preparedness for urban or modern elements and configurations. 
Roger S. Ulrich, Biophilia, Biophobia, and Natural Landscapes, in THE BIOPHILIA HYPOTHE-
SIS 73, 88 (Stephen R. Kellert & Edward O. Wilson eds., 1993). 
142 See LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL 
IN AMERICA 3 (1964) ("[TJhe pastoral ideal has been used to define the meaning of America ever 
since the age of discovery, and it has not yet lost its hold upon the native imagination."). 
143 See PETER ROWE, MAKING A MIDDLE LANDSCAPE 218-34 (1991) (discussing the American 
pastoral tradition). 
144 Rowe cites Emerson's tract Nature, written in 1836, as an early American expression of 
the pastoral ideal. [d. at 221. Emerson exalts nature as preferable to the city: 
Here is the sanctity which shames our religions, and reality which discredits our 
heroes. Here we find Nature to be the circumstance which dwarfs every other circum-
stance, and judges like a god all men that come to her. We have crept out of our close 
and crowded houses into the night and morning, and we see what majestic beauties 
daily wrap us in their bosom. How willingly we would escape the barriers which render 
them comparatively impotent, escape the sophistication and second thought, and suffer 
nature to entice us. The tempered light of the woods is like a perpetual morning, and 
is stimulating and heroic. The anciently-reported spells of these places creep up on us. 
The stems of pines, hemlocks and oaks almost gleam like iron on the excited eye. The 
incommunicable trees begin to persuade us to live with them, and quit our life of solemn 
trifles. Here no history, or church, or state, is interpolated on the divine sky and the 
immortal year. How easily we might walk onward into the opening landscape, absorbed 
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Nathaniel Hawthorne145 in literature and to Thomas Cole146 in land-
scape painting.147 
Pastoralism is a cornerstone of American intellectual and artistic 
experience, particularly when it comes to location of appropriate 
grounds for human settlement. Although there are certain naive 
and simpleminded applications of the concept as an escape from 
civilization and urbanity, pastoralism is essentially a complex formu-
lation. Although it never denies the self-enlightening and moral 
benefits to be gained by a rural existence, it does not deny tech-
nological developments either. In its most sophisticated forms, 
pastoralism continues to serve as a critical lens through which to 
mark human progress and as an optimistic source for dealing with 
threats encroaching from either a natural or an urban wilderness. 
It also serves to remind us of basic, honest social values, particu-
larly during the times of considerable change.148 
Thus, for more than two hundred years, the pastoral ideal has 
shaped the national identity. Statistics suggest the breadth of Amer-
ica's attachment to the landscape. According to the 1994 National 
Environmental Forum Survey conducted by Roper Starch World-
wide, seventy-nine percent of Americans expressed concern for the 
by new pictures and by thoughts fast succeeding each other, until by degrees the 
recollection of home was crowded out of the mind, all memory obliterated by the 
tyranny of the present, and we were led in triumph by nature. 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Nature, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
406, 40(H)7 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1968). 
145 Rowe notes that Marx cites Hawthorne's Sleepy Hollow, written in 1844, as an example of 
"imaginative and complex" pastoralism, in which the opposing forces of countryside and city 
form a dialectic. ROWE, supra note 143, at 219. The same theme occurs in many of Hawthorne's 
short stories, including The New England Village: 
Some years ago it was my destiny to reside in a New England village. Nothing can be 
more pleasant than its situation. All that nature ever did for a place, she has done for 
this. It is sheltered on the north by high hills, and fringed on the south with forests of 
oaks and elms; it has waterfalls and cascades, and, what is more surprising, they are 
suffered to flow on through meadow and valley, without being condemned to the 
treadmill. In this country everything is compelled to do duty. Our forests are cut down 
for firewood; our rocks hewn into state prisons, and some of our modern speculators 
mean to make old Niagara, that has roared and bellowed so many hundred years for 
its own amusement, actually work for its living, and support cotton and woolen manu-
factures. 
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, The New England Village, in THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF 
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE 584, 584 (1959). Of course, Hawthorne expressed similar sentiments 
in stories such as The Great Stone Face and other accounts of Franconia Notch in the White 
Mountains of New Hampshire. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE GREAT STONE FACE (1931). 
146 Rowe cites Cole's landscape paintings after 1827 as expressive of the pastoral theme, 
including Expulsionfrom the Garden of Eden, and The Oxbow. ROWE, supra note 143, at 222-23. 
147Id. 
148Id. at 226-27. 
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environment.149 Forty-two percent of Americans say they have con-
tributed to environmental organizations, and fifty-four percent say 
they are likely to do SO.150 An appreciation of scenic beauty and natural 
landscapes surely has become a part of our collective national psyche. 
Why does this attraction to the scenic landscape persist? Much 
recent work concludes that there is an undeniable "aesthetic experi-
ence" connected to the landscape.l5l The nature of this aesthetic ex-
perience "refers to the subjective thoughts, feelings, and emotions 
expressed by an individual during the course of an experience."152 The 
experience has both philosophical and psychological manifestations. 
In the philosophical realm, it has been asserted that, 
aesthetic experiences have a completeness and coherence, a unity 
that makes them stand out from the experiences and flow of 
everyday life. The experience is said to be intrinsically gratifying 
in that the percipient derives a satisfying pleasure from merely 
beholding the object (in this case, a landscape) .... [D]uring the 
aesthetic experience we behold an object without wanting to ac-
quire it, possess it, use it, consume it, or in some other way regard 
it for its potential utility. Simply beholding the object gives us the 
special experience that we derive from objects that please us 
merely upon being seen.153 
In short, the benefit of the aesthetic experience-inherent pleasure-
is invaluable. 
Studies of landscape aesthetics have also pointed to the psychologi-
cal aspects of the aesthetic experience. In assessing the nature of 
conscious experience-of which aesthetic experience is only a part-
certain "peak" or "flow" experience has been isolated and charac-
terized. One scholar has observed that such experience has 
a richness otherwise not present in the experience of ordinary life 
events, a unity within itself, and a detachment from the normal 
flow of events. Although the experience is highly valued and 
desirable, it is not something one can force to happen. Instead, ... 
the experience is a passive one that comes to the individual, who 
is in a properly responsive state of mind .... [T]he experience 
149 David B. Rockland & Gwyn L. Fletcher, The Economy, the Environment, and Public 
Opinion, 20 EPA J. 39 (Fall 1994). 
150 I d. at 40. 
151 The concept of the "aesthetic experience" is discussed in Richard E. Chenoweth and Paul 
H. Gobster, The Nature and Ecology of Aesthetic Experiences in the Landscape, LANDSCAPE 
J., Spring 1990, at 1-8. 
152Id. at 2. 
153Id. 
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may cause the percipient to feel disoriented in space and time and 
to have a sense of humility, unity, and introspection.154 
723 
The natural landscape may also present psychologically valuable 
opportunities for leisure and recreation. While little research has been 
done on the link between landscape aesthetics and psychological well-
being, "[a] large body of research on recreational experiences has 
shown convincingly that leisure activities in natural settings are im-
portant for helping people cope with stress as well as in meeting other 
needs unrelated to stress."155 Furthermore, "there are indications in 
some recreation studies that part of the restoration benefit stems 
from exposure to natural surroundings."156 In other words, recrea-
tional activities in the natural landscape may have a recuperative 
effect. This effect has been confirmed by studies which have shown 
that "viewing unthreatening natural landscapes tends to promote 
faster and more complete restoration from stress than does viewing 
unblighted urban or built environments lacking nature."157 Taken to-
gether, these studies suggest that the scenic landscape plays a valu-
able role in our collective mental health.158 
154 Id. at 2-3; see also Kenneth H. Craik, The Comprehension of the Everyday Physical 
Environment, LANDSCAPE J. 29 (1968). 
155 Ulrich, supra note 141, at 10()""Ol. 
156Id. at 101 (citation omitted). 
157Id. at 102. These studies have involved prison inmates, psychiatric patients, and acutely 
stressed patients in health care settings. According to Ulrich, these populations "provide some 
of the best opportunities for scientific research in real environments on the effects of viewing 
nature .... " Id. at 106. 
158 At least one recent case takes seriously the nexus between psychological well-being and 
landscape aesthetics. In Crown Motors v. City of Redding, 283 Cal. Rptr. 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991), the Court of Appeals of California reviewed an ordinance prohibiting electronic reader 
boards. The ordinance was passed as an "urgency measure." Id. at 357. An urgency measure, 
unlike a run-of-the-mill ordinance, takes effect immediately. However, the ordinance must 
address the "immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety" and contain "a 
declaration of the facts constituting the urgency." Id. at 359. The adoption of this ordinance as 
an urgency measure had the effect of eliminating any vested rights possessed by the advertiser. 
The stated purposes of the ordinance included the prevention of hazards to life and property, 
the protection of property values, and the maintenance of the "attractiveness of the community." 
Id. at 358. In its declaration of facts supporting the ordinance, the city amplified its reasoning: 
It is hereby found that the public health need ofthe community is met by the imme-
diate imposition of a ban on electronic reader-board signs since such signs are aestheti-
cally displeasing and out of harmony with the character of this community so as to 
constitute visual blight which reduces the quality of life within the community to the 
extent that the overall public health is detrimentally affected. 
Id. The court noted that "public health" is a flexible term, which "must be interpreted according 
to the circumstances in which it is used." Id. at 359. In a novel ruling, the court equated 
aesthetics with mental health: 
We see no reason to restrict from these broad powers, within the spectrum of public 
health, the power of the city council to advance the quality oflife in the community by 
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Thus, there is ample support for the proposition that enhancement 
of the visual resource constitutes a valid public purpose. The histori-
cal, philosophical, and psychological literature of landscape aesthetics 
describes a link between the scenic visual resource and aesthetic 
experience. Aesthetic experience has intrinsic value; it is also a com-
ponent of leisure, recreation, and stress-reduction. These contribu-
tions of the scenic landscape undoubtedly promote the general wel-
fare. While few, if any, courts have acknowledged or described the 
exact dimensions of the connection between landscape aesthetics and 
the public welfare, the academic literature has established a solid 
foundation for the demonstration of such a connection. 
c. Visual Resources and Due Process 
The growth of landscape aesthetics as a cross-disciplinary field has 
also addressed the second problem identified in Youngstown v. Kahn 
Bros. Building Co.-the inherent subjectivity of regulatory objec-
tives.159 The court's chief concern in Kahn was that "the public view 
as to what is necessary for aesthetic progress greatly varies."l60 The 
notion that the legislature would impose its taste in matters of aes-
thetics has long influenced judicial review of statutes and regulations. 
However, the emergence of empirical studies that attempt to "verify" 
preferences in landscape aesthetics has tempered the strength of the 
Kahn court's objection. 
During the last twenty years a large research literature, running 
to hundreds of studies internationally, has focused on affective 
responses to natural and urban landscapes. Virtually all of these 
studies made use of affective or emotion-laden rating scales to 
obtain data; among the most common have been preference (lik-
ing), pleasantness, and scenic beauty.161 
The methodology of such studies usually involves the use of landscape 
photographs to elicit responses from members of the local community. 
eliminating visual blight. Mental health is certainly included in the public health .... 
The broad definition of public health and the city council's broad powers to implement 
general policy to conclude aesthetics may properly be considered a public health matter 
under the circumstances of this case. 
Id. It is unclear whether the court reached this conclusion based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence linking aesthetics with mental health, the elasticity of the statutory term, or the fact 
that the electronic reader-board that inspired the ordinance was 13 feet high and 23 feet wide, 
resting on a pedestal rising almost 37 feet. Id. at 358. The more tempting conclusion is the latter. 
159 See supra note 39-40 and accompanying text. 
160 Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925). 
161 Ulrich, supra note 141, at 90--91. 
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By weighing these responses, the researcher is able to assign per-
ceived values to various landscape features and thereby identify a 
degree of consensus over which visual resources merit protection. For 
example, researchers engaged in a study of the Lower Connecticut 
River Valley used fifty-six landscape photographs, selected from a 
pool of over 300, to assess the visual preferences of 407 subjects.162 
The photographs depicted a variety of landscapes containing such 
features as second-growth forests, townscapes, open water, farmscapes, 
placid river valleys, flat fields, derelict landscapes, rushing water, and 
town commons. The subjects were given unlimited time to review the 
photographs. The subjects were then asked to grade the landscapes 
as to perceived scenic value.l63 The researchers provided detailed 
instructions in order to achieve a weighted sorting score for each 
landscape and to assess preferences.l64 The methodology of this study 
is similar to that routinely employed in landscape preference stud-
ies.165 
Although the use of empirical studies to "verify" scenic beauty has 
been the subject of some debate,166 "[f]indings from these and other 
verbal scales usually are highly correlated."167 For example, studies 
consistently show high preference for landscapes with water fea-
tures. l68 In very general terms, 
European, North American, and Japanese adult groups tend to 
respond to scenes as natural if the landscape is predominantly 
vegetation, water, and mountains, if artificial features such as 
buildings, automobiles, and advertising signs are absent or incon-
spicuous, and if the dominant visual contours or edges are curvi-
linear or irregular rather than starkly rectilinear or regular.169 
162 Douglas Amedeo et aI, Landscape Feature Classification as a Determinant of Perceived 
Scenic Value, 8 LANDSCAPE J. 26 (1989). 
163 Id. at 38. 
164 Id. at 39-40. Several other studies are briefly described in Richard Brooks & Peter 
Lavigne, Aesthetic Theory and Landscape Protection: The Many Meanings of Beauty and Their 
Implications for the Design, Control, and Protection of Vermont:S Landscape, 4 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POLICY 129, 144-53 (1985). See also Elwood L. Shafer Jr. & Robert O. Brush, How 
to Measure Preferences for Photographs of Natural Landscapes, 4 LANDSCAPE PLAN. 237-56 
(1977). 
165 See, e.g., Robert G. Ribe, A General Model for Understanding the Perception of Scenic 
Beauty in Northern Hardwood Forests, LANDSCAPE J. 86 (1990). 
166 For a succinct point-counterpoint discussion of these issues, see A.A. Carlson, On the 
Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty, 4 LANDSCAPE PLAN. 131 (1977), and Robert G. Ribe, 
On the Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty-A Response, 9 LANDSCAPE PLAN. 61 (1982). 
167 Ulrich, supra note 141, at 91. 
168 Id. at 92. 
169 Id. at 95 (citations omitted). 
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As the preceding quotation suggests, results are consistent even when 
sociocultural factors are assessed.170 
[O]n balance, the pattern of findings that has emerged over the 
last two decades runs directly counter to the initial expectation 
of wide differences as a function of learning or experience-related 
variables. The overarching conclusion supported by this large 
body of research is that similarities in responses to natural scenes 
usually far outweigh the differences across individuals, groups, 
and diverse European, North American, and Asian cultures.l71 
There is, then, sufficient empirical evidence to suggest the existence 
of a communal concept of scenic beauty.l72 Further, the verifiability of 
aesthetic preferences means that aesthetically based regulations can 
satisfy the requirements of due process. 
Has the regulatory community latched onto empirical study to 
justify its rules? On the federal level, empirical assessment of visual 
resources has been ongoing for several decades. The National Forest 
Service of the United States Department of Agriculture has used a 
visual management system to supervise aspects of its domain since at 
least 1974.173 Visual assessment techniques are also used in planning 
170 See Gary D. Hampe, The Influence of Sociocultural Factors upon Scenic Preferences in 
VISUAL PREFERENCES OF TRAVELERS-ALONG THE BLUE RIDGE PARKWAY 37 (Francis P. 
Noe & William E. Hammitt eds., 1987). Six social background variables were used in measuring 
responses: age, sex, residence until age 16, educational level, socioeconomic index (occupational 
SEI), and total (gross) household income. Id. at 38. In his summary, the author concluded that 
"[t]he consistency of preferring or not preferring the vistas was nothing short of remarkable." 
Id. at 49. 
171 Ulrich, supra note 141, at 93 (citations omitted). 
172 For a detailed discussion of the methods used to reach decision on landscapes worthy of 
protection see Richard Brooks & Peter Lavigne, Aesthetic Theory and Landscape Protection: 
The Many Meanings of Beauty and Their Implications for the Design, Control, and Protection 
of Vermont~ Landscape, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLICY 129, 141-44 (1985). The authors 
identify four "philosophies of beauty." Id. Extreme relativism "holds that every individual 
determines beauty differently." Id. at 141. Moderate relativism "suggests that, even if humans 
are the measure of beauty, there are important cultural, class, community, or other similarities 
of views among groups of persons which permit them to agree on what is beautiful." Id. The 
authors opine that architectural controls are based on such consensus. Id. at 142. Moral objec-
tivism holds that "although our perceptions of beauty may consist of emotional feelings or moral 
perceptions, these reactions are proper to all people, because of either a common human nature 
or human experience, or a common perception of the objects producing the reactions." Id. This 
position, no doubt, would be consistent with the biophilia hypothesis. See supra note 141. Finally, 
cognitive objectivism attempts to identify "those characteristics of a ... natural scene which are 
associated with the judgment of the beautiful." Brooks & Lavigne, supra, at 143. Empirical 
studies are imperfect, but useful, tools in determining the factors important in identifying 
"beauty." Id. at 144. 
The authors conclude that all four theories of beauty ought to be incorporated into any 
regulatory action. Id. 
173 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, 1-2 NATIONAL 
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national parks174 and administering federallands.175 Local regulations 
to protect the scenic resource, on the other hand, are rarely accom-
panied by preference studies or assessment techniques. If anything, 
local regulations frequently rest on a "seat-of-the-pants" consensus: 
the view is pretty, therefore it should be protected. Because the 
majority position has been rationalized on a rather superficial analy-
sis-that beauty is preferable to blight-there is little incentive for 
localities to ground local scenic view ordinances in empirical research. 
The absence of sophisticated scenic-view analysis becomes apparent 
when one systematically surveys judicial review of local visual re-
source protection ordinances. 
D. Judicial Review of Ordinances in Majority Position States 
In majority view states, localities may advance protection of the 
visual resource as a sole regulatory objective. This judicial support 
has encouraged local governments to regulate both traditional and 
innovative targets. Such regulation generally takes several forms. 
Traditional eyesore regulations remain important. In addition, local 
governments have passed laws protecting viewsheds and view corri-
dors. This section examines judicial review of each type of ordinance. 
1. Eyesore Regulations 
Ordinances intended to accomplish exclusively aesthetic objectives 
are often enacted in the form of eyesore regulations.176 Where exclu-
sively aesthetic regulation is permissible, the eyesore is targeted 
solely because of its aesthetic attributes. Upon judicial review, the 
eyesore's effects on health or safety are unimportant.177 It is the local 
FOREST LANDSCAPE MANAGEMENT, (Agriculture Handbook Number 462) (1974); see also 
Robert E. Benson & James R. Ullrich, USDA, Forest Service, Visual Impacts of Forest 
Management Activities: Findings on Public Preferences (June 1981) (Research Paper INT-262). 
174 See, e.g., Carl Steinitz, Toward a Sustainable Landscape with High Visual Preference and 
High Ecological Integrity: The Loop Road in Acadia National Park, U.S.A., 19 LANDSCAPE & 
URBAN PLAN. 213 (1990). 
175 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Pub. No. 024-011-
00116-6, VISUAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 13 (n.d.). The Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 requires the BLM to manage public lands "in a manner that will protect 
the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water 
resource, and archeological values." Id. at 8. 
176 See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text (outlining the types of eyesores targeted by 
local regulations). 
177 Nonetheless, local governments in majority camp states continue to cite health or safety 
as an ancillary purpose of their ordinances, probably to promote greater judicial tolerance, and 
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government's aesthetic goal, standing alone, that the court endorses. 
One of the earliest decisions in this genre is Oregon City v. Hartke.178 
In this case, the city adopted an ordinance wholly excluding wrecking 
yards.179 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in adopting the "aesthetics 
alone" position, strongly encouraged use of the police power to pre-
serve the visual resource: "[T]here is a growing judicial recognition 
of the power of a city to impose zoning restrictions which can be 
justified solely upon the ground that they will tend to prevent or 
minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings."18o 
In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached the same conclu-
sion.181 Here, the town of Brookline adopted a bylaw imposing various 
restrictions on off-site signs and billboards.182 The court found no need 
for any rationale but aesthetics: 
[C]ourts have engaged in a reasoning process, often amounting to 
nothing more than legal fiction, in order to avoid recognizing 
aesthetics as an appropriate basis for the exercise of the police 
power. We feel that this approach ... obscures the basic issues .... 
Although the town argues that its by-laws can be upheld on the 
basis of public safety and traffic control, our review of the authori-
ties indicates, at best, conflicting support for this proposition. 
Therefore, the issue squarely before us is whether the town by-
laws, enacted primarily or solely for aesthetic reasons, are within 
the scope of the police power. We conclude that aesthetics alone 
may justify the exercise of the police power .... 183 
Courts have routinely upheld regulations designed to control other 
types of eyesores solely for aesthetic purposes.l84 
For the most part, the "first-generation" view ordinances upheld in 
these cases focus on the eyesore, not the enhancement of a specific 
visual resource area. The ordinances in Hartke, Donnelly, and other 
decisions from the early post-Berman period are directed at a specific 
target, an object so universally scorned-so "ugly" -that the legisla-
probably out of habit. See, e.g., City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 836 S.W.2d 863 (Ark. 1992) 
(upholding ordinance regulating temporary attraction signs for traffic safety and aesthetic 
purposes). 
178 400 P.2d 255 (Or. 1965). 
179Id. at 258. 
180 Id. at 261. 
181 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Mass. 1975). 
182Id. at 711. 
183 Id. at 716-17 (citations omitted). 
184 See, e.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding ordinance banning clothes 
lines in front or side yard on aesthetic grounds alone). For a more contemporary example, see 
Warren v. City of Marietta, 288 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. 1982) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting 
overnight school bus parking in residential area on aesthetic grounds alone). See also supra 
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ture presumes there is a consensus to regulate its location, appear-
ance, or very existence. In fact, the eyesore is considered so objec-
tionable that the requirement of a nexus to health or safety, long 
required before Berman, has been eliminated. To the extent that a 
sign or junkyard ordinance protects a "view," the specific view is of 
little or secondary importance. The regulation's primary purpose is to 
target the objectionable entity-there may have been, in fact, no view 
of any consequence impaired by the eyesore. In this regard, the focus 
of first-generation eyesore regulations is no different than regulations 
of the pre-Berman era, in which the scenic resource itself was rele-
gated to a secondary purpose. 
More recent eyesore regulations in "aesthetics alone" jurisdictions 
reflect a greater appreciation of the scenic resource. These ordinances 
represent a second generation in that they acknowledge and protect 
the landscape behind the eyesore. In essence, it is the eyesore's inter-
ference with the viewshed that justifies government regulation. The 
ordinance may identify the protected landscape generically, rather 
than delineating a specific part of the scenery that reflects the char-
acter of the area.185 Alternatively, the regulation may precisely iden-
tify the protected landscape.186 
Typically, second-generation eyesore regulations based on aesthetic 
objectives alone are firmly rooted in the promotion of tourism. For 
example, the northern-tier states of New England are now unanimous 
in their view that the protection of scenic views serves the general 
welfare.187 Moreover, the highest courts of these states have reached 
this consensus while highlighting the value of the scenic resource, not 
the ugliness of the eyesore. 
Maine was the first of this group of states to recognize that protec-
tion of scenic views stands as a valid governmental purpose. In John 
Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar,188 the United States District Court for 
the District of Maine189 reviewed the provisions of a statute providing 
for the state-wide elimination of off-site billboard advertising.190 The 
notes 62, 81-85 (citing cases, some of which were decided in majority camp jurisdictions solely 
on aesthetic grounds). 
185 See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text (discussing Sandgate, Vermont's ordinance 
protecting "the Vermont scene"). 
186 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing the town of Conway's efforts to 
protect New Hampshire's Mt. Washington Valley). 
187 For the importance of the tourist trade to northern New England, see supra notes 16-24 
and accompanying text. 
188 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978), rev'd sub nom. John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 
F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980). 
189 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the First Amendment claims raised 
by the advertising company. 
190 John Donnelly & Sons, 639 F.2d at 6. 
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legislature prefaced the act by stating that "scattered outdoor adver-
tising throughout the State is detrimental to the preservation of the 
State's scenic resources"; furthermore, the act was intended "to pre-
serve the State's scenic beauties not only for their aesthetic value but 
because the visual attractiveness of the State substantially promotes 
tourism, one of the State's major industries, as well as its general 
economic and cultural development."191 In upholding the statute, the 
court rejected the advertiser's argument that aesthetics could not 
stand alone: 
The nation's recently-awakened and growing concern for the qual-
ity of its environment and the various and widespread steps taken 
by individuals, citizen groups, and governmental bodies to protect 
and enhance natural resources demonstrate beyond reasonable 
question that the Maine Act serves substantial governmental in-
terests through the preservation of aesthetic values.192 
Although the decision was later reversed on First Amendment grounds, 
the principles enunciated by Mallar remain valid in Maine: aesthetic 
regulation, including the protection of scenic views, may stand alone. 
For example, in Brophy v. Town of Castine, a landowner challenged 
a zoning ordinance that required a waterfront setback of seventy-five 
feet. 193 The town had applied the ordinance to prevent the landowner 
from installing a satellite dish. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
upheld the regulation on the sole rationale that the regulation pro-
moted "the public's aesthetic welfare."194 
The Supreme Court of Vermont has also concluded that enhance-
ment of the visual resource, broadly conceived, is a valid basis for local 
land-use regulation. In Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, a property 
owner asserted that the town's zoning provision banning junkyards 
was based solely on aesthetic considerations, an allegedly unconstitu-
tional exercise of the police power.195 The court disagreed, noting that 
the Vermont Zoning Enabling Act had been modernized to acknow-
ledge aesthetics as a valid purpose of zoning.196 Specifically, munici-
palities had been authorized to "encourage and enhance the attrac-
tiveness of the Vermont scene."197 The town's plan, which formed the 
basis for its zoning ordinance, attempted "to limit development, main-
191 John Donnelly & Sons, 453 F. Supp. at 1275-76. 
192 Id. at 1278 (footnote omitted). 
193 534 A.2d 663, 663 (Me. 1987). 
194 I d. at 664. 
195 589 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Vt. 1990). 
196Id. 
197Id. (quoting 24 VA. CODE ANN. § 4302(a)(4) (Michie 1992». 
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tain open space, and achieve 'the best possible quality of environment 
for the Town's residents."'198 The "Vermont scene" behind the Cole-
hamer junkyard was not described by the court, nor were specific 
goals of scenic preservation stated in the ordinance. For the court, 
this was apparently inconsequential. The "Vermont scene," although 
not susceptible to exact description, was assuredly not promoted by 
a landscape featuring junkyards. The ordinance was ruled constitu-
tional and the state joined the majority camp.199 
Of all the northern New England states, New Hampshire's courts 
have best enunciated an appreciation of the value and nature of scenic 
resources. In Asselin v. Town of Conway, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire reviewed a zoning ordinance that regulated sign illumina-
tion.200 The court found that the ordinance was adopted "solely to 
promote aesthetic values, including preserving scenic vistas, discour-
aging development from competing with the natural environment, 
and promoting the character of a 'country community."'201 The court 
noted that Conway is "[n]estled in the Mount Washington ValleY,"202 
and that the highway upon which the challenger's proposed sign 
would have been located "offers striking views of the mountains and 
ledges to the west."203 Moreover, the court found that "[i]t is reason-
able to infer that the scenic vistas sought to be preserved by the town 
include the splendor of mountains at twilight and the brilliance of 
stars at night."204 Relying on Berman, the court held that "municipali-
ties may validly exercise zoning power solely to advance aesthetic 
values, because the preservation or enhancement of the visual envi-
ronment may promote the general welfare.''205 The court's ruling is a 
clear example of a court upholding an eyesore regulation, supported 
on aesthetic grounds alone, because a specific background view was 
protected by the local government. 
198 [d. at 1211. The town's goals were consistent with the enabling act. [d. 
199 [d. 
200 628 A.2d 247 (N.H. 1993). 
201 [d. at 249. 
202 [d. at 248. 
203 [d. at 249. The highway in question, New Hampshire Route 16, is undoubtedly one of the 
state's most travelled tourist paths, with expansive views of the Presidential Range of the White 
Mountains available in many sections. 
204 [d. at 250. The court seemed particularly impressed by the testimony of "an expert witness 
experienced in planning for the preservation and enhancement of visual environments." [d. The 
expert testified that "internally illuminated signs appear as 'disconnected squares of light' at 
dusk and at night, and that the 'overall effect' of 'an internally-lit sign is to create a visual block 
that is seen at some great distance sort of bobbing at the windshield,' while external lights 
'soften the impact' of signs in the darkness." [d. (quotations from trial transcript). 
205 Asselin, 628 A.2d at 250 (emphasis in original). 
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The tone of these decisions from northern New England is quite 
different from the approach taken in such first-generation cases as 
Hartke. Here, the judicial, if not regulatory, focus is the landscape-
the scenic view shared by residents and travellers alike. There is in 
these decisions an implicit appreciation of Gussow's contention that 
"[t]he visual landscape, the environment we see, gives shape to our 
character."206 What, if not this, could the Vermont legislature-and its 
supreme court-have meant by endorsing regulatory enhancement of 
the "Vermont scene"? The courts of South Carolina,207 Alaska,208 and 
Arkansas209 have expressed similar sentiments in recent reviews of 
eyesore regulations.210 
Nonetheless, these second-generation eyesore ordinances remain 
primitive in their understanding of the scenic resource. The regula-
tions do not, as they might, focus on eyesores that interfere with a 
specific viewshed-for example, an area containing a mountain, water 
scene, or townscape crucial to the community's character. Instead, the 
regulations banish eyesores that interfere with the generic landscape. 
It is the foreground, not the target viewshed, that provides the regu-
latory focus. In failing to manage or enhance a specific visual resource 
area, these modern eyesore regulations are little different in form 
from those of the pre-Berman era.211 Only in viewshed and view 
corridor ordinances do local governments incorporate theories of land-
scape aesthetics into protection of the scenic landscape. 
206 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
207 See Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 397 S.E.2d 662 (S.C. 1990). Here, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina reviewed an ordinance banning internally illuminated signs visible from 
public rights of way and beaches. The court endorsed the regulation, solely on aesthetic grounds, 
because "it seeks to protect the unique aesthetics of Hilton Head Island." [d. at 664 (citations 
omitted). 
208 See Barber v. Municipality of Anchorage, 776 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1989). The Supreme Court 
of Alaska upheld Anchorage's ordinance prohibiting off-premises advertising signs. The ration-
ale was chiefly borrowed from the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Members of the City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984): billboards constitute a "visual assault on 
citizens ... presented by an accumulation of signs." [d. at 1037 (quoting Members of the City 
Council, 466 U.S. at 807). 
209 See City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 647 S.W.2d 439 (Ark. 1983). 
210 However, some states make no mention of the visual resource in reaching the "aesthetics 
alone" position. See, e.g., City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Advertising Ass'n of Lakeland, 414 So. 
2d 1030 (Fla. 1982) (billboards); Warren v. City of Marietta, 288 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. 1982) (upholding 
ordinance banning overnight school bus parking in residence district); Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. 
City of Raleigh, 306 S.E.2d 192 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (windblown signs); Temple Baptist Church, 
Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982) (billboards). 
211 See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text. 
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2. Viewsheds 
Local viewshed protection ordinances borrow regulatory concepts 
from resource protection overlay districts,212 from NEPA-style design 
regulations,213 and from eyesore prohibitions. Viewshed ordinances 
generally take one of two forms. The first type of ordinance allows 
development, subject to design approval, within the protected area; 
under the second approach, the viewshed is delineated as a preserva-
tion district. 
Under either approach, the visual resource area must first be de-
fined.214 As in other types of overlay districts, the visual resource must 
be measured, mapped, and reduced to comprehensible boundaries. 
Under the first, more flexible, approach, applicable rules may prohibit 
offensive land-use practices and mandate performance standards. Eye-
sores, long banned from the foreground, are likely to be banned from 
the viewshed itself. Other uses, whether available as of right or con-
ditionally, are generally subject to design review or site-plan ap-
proval. This process shapes land uses within the viewshed area in 
order to minimize impact on the visual resource. Under the second, 
preservation-oriented approach, the goal is to prevent alteration of 
the visual resource area.215 
The establishment of boundaries for the viewshed district neces-
sarily involves application of some of the principles developed in the 
study and assessment of landscape aesthetics. The view to be pro-
tected, as perceived from a specific location, must legislatively be 
deemed worthy of protection. This may involve nothing more than an 
unscientifically determined consensus. For example, the Massachu-
setts towns of Harvard, Ayer, and Shirley and the Massachusetts 
Land Bank recently adopted bylaws to regulate land uses in Fort 
Devens, a decommissioned army base.216 The bylaws require develop-
ers of the Fort Devens site to consider the possible impact of devel-
opment on views toward Mounts Wachusett and Monadnock from the 
Prospect Hill Overlook in the town of Harvard.217 No specific studies 
212 See MARK BOBROWSKI, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 
480 n.30 (1993). 
213 See infra note 238 for an example of an ordinance that adopts a design review approach. 
214 For a discussion of how viewsheds may be scientifically analyzed, see TADAHIKO HIGUCHI, 
THE VISUAL AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF LANDSCAPES (Charles S. Terry trans. 1983). 
215 See infra notes 242-66 and accompanying text. 
216 The author represented the town of Harvard in the negotiations to draft the bylaws. 
217 Devens Bylaws, § III.J (Nov. 18, 1994). 
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were done to delineate this viewshed; in any event, the viewshed is 
so vast as to defy local regulation.218 
In a more scientific approach, detailed studies of the viewshed may 
precede enactment of a local regulation. In The Legal Landscape, the 
authors provide a description of the methodology used in their study 
of a fifty-mile stretch of the Seaway Trail, a highway paralleling the 
St. Lawrence River in upstate New York. 219 The study involved black-
and-white photography of all views from the highway to the river.220 
The photographs were then spliced together to create 125 panoramas, 
which the authors submitted to local residents and students for visual 
preference testing.221 Based on the results, local governments along 
the river were encouraged to protect the higher-quality views.222 In-
cluded among the recommendations was "[d]evelopment of overlay 
zoning and site review mechanisms to restrict encroachment from 
private development on high-quality view areas."223 
Unfortunately, there are few, if any, appellate level decisions in 
which the validity of a viewshed ordinance is directly at issue. There 
are, however, several instances in which aspects of a viewshed ordi-
nance have been litigated. For example, in Wilkinson v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Pitkin County, the Colorado Supreme Court 
upheld permit denials in part because of impacts upon scenic views.224 
In this case, a developer sought and was denied county permits for a 
low-impact subdivision.225 On appeal, the developer chiefly asserted 
that the county's land-use regulations, including ordinances protecting 
views, were inconsistent with the police power.226 The court rejected 
this argument, noting that Colorado's Land Use Act227 provides local 
governments with extensive authority, including the power to "[p]re-
serv[e] areas of historical and archeological importance"; to "[r]egu-
lat[e] the use of land on the basis of the impact thereof on the com-
munity or surrounding areas"; and to "plan[] for and regulat[e] the 
218 Mount Wachusett is located in Westminster, Massachusetts, approximately 20 miles from 
the town of Harvard. Between Harvard and the mountain are the towns of Lancaster and 
Princeton and the city of Leominster. Mount Monadnock is nearly 40 miles northwest of Harvard 
in the state of New Hampshire. 
219 See SMARDON & KARP, supra note 32, at 106--20. 
220 See id. at 114-15. 
221 See, e.g., id. at 116--20. 
222 See id. at 107. 
223 [d. 
224 872 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), eert. denied, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 473 (Colo. May 
16, 1994). 
225 See id. at 1272. 
226 See id. at 1275. 
227 Local Gov't Land Use Control Enabling Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-104(1) (1988). 
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use of land so as to provide planned and orderly use of land and 
protection of the environment in a manner consistent with constitu-
tional rights."228 
Furthermore, the court upheld the substantive decision of the county, 
particularly with regard to the scenic impacts of the proposed project.229 
The court noted that the county's land-use policy objectives included 
the following goals: "to prevent scenic degradation and to preserve 
and create scenic views from public places within the county," and to 
"minimize adverse visual effects of roads and facilities by regulating 
the location and use of future development when new or increased 
roads and facilities would be required."230 The court sustained the 
permit denial because the project would affect "scenic qualities of 
Smugglers Mountain as viewed from other locations in the county."231 
In effect, the county policies amounted to a viewshed ordinance, or a 
county version of NEPA, with the entire jurisdiction serving as the 
protected visual resource area. 
In Arkules v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Paradise ValleY,232 
the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a variance awarded from a 
building regulation that required construction to "blend with the 
mountain background and to be made from materials or colors which 
would not unduly reflect light."233 The property owner had requested 
the variance because, 
all of his life he had hoped to build a Mediterranean home and now 
he felt he was about to see it built. He said he specifically wanted 
a house with columns, and a white house. He hastened to say, he 
did not mean ''hospital white" he meant offwhite. He said the 
architecture and the entire house was designed around his dream 
of a white house with columns.234 
In this case, the validity of the building regulations, which amounted 
to viewshed constraints, was not directly at issue. In fact, the defen-
dant conceded the validity of the aesthetic purposes promoted by the 
regulation.235 Without comment, the court endorsed the scope of view-
228 Wilkinson, 872 P.2d at 1276. 
229 See id. at 1278. 
230 [d. 
231 [d. 
232 728 P.2d 657 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
233 [d. at 658. 
234 [d. at 660. 
235 The court nullified the variance for failure to comply with statutory requirements. See id. 
at 661. 
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shed protection available to local governments, even in a state consis-
tently within the minority camp.236 
The most illustrative case reviewing viewshed ordinances is Ross 
v. City of Rolling Hills Estates.237 The city, acting to protect the views 
of its hillsides, enacted an ordinance that stands as a virtual model for 
local scenic-view regulation.238 In the purpose clause of the ordinance, 
the city offered the following rationale: 
236 See id. 
237 238 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Cal. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 983 (1987). 
238 Footnote two of the California Court of Appeals opinion contains the entire relevant 
ordinance, which is a virtual model of a local scenic viewshed ordinance: 
1951. EVALUATION AND REVIEW. To protect the visual quality of highly scenic 
areas and maintain the rural character of the City, new development should not 
degrade highly scenic natural historic or open areas and shall be visually subordinate 
to the scenic quality of these areas. New development within the various view sheds 
contained in the City that would have a significant visual impact to those living 
adjacent to the development, shall be subject to design review. This review shall ensure 
that development and its cumulative impact is consistent with the previously men-
tioned standards. The design procedures and standards employed in new develop-
ments, alterations and additions to existing structures and lots should include appro-
priate measures that are consistent with appearance and design goals of the View 
Protection Ordinance. Development proposals should be coordinated in order to: 
(a) Maximize open space preservation. 
(b) Protect view corridors, natural vegetation, land forms, and other features. 
(c) Minimize the appearance of visually intrusive structures. 
(d) Prevent the obstruction of property owners' views by requiring appropriate 
construction of new structures or additions to existing buildings or adjacent parcels. 
(e) Assess the potential view loss from public areas of any proposed major structures 
as well as alterations and additions to existing structures. 
(f) Determine whether other suitable design options are available to the property 
owner in order that view obstructions may be eliminated or lessened in severity. 
1952. CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. Should it appear that a potential view impair-
ment may result from a proposed development, addition or alteration, the site shall be 
subjected to a View Preservation Site Inspection. A fee shall be charged for such 
inspection as the City Council shall fix by resolution. 
1953. INSPECTION. Upon such inspection, should the City zone clearance official 
determine that the proposed development addition or alteration will impair a view site, 
the matter shall be referred for hearing and review by the Planning Commission 
pursuant to sections 1954 and 1955 below. 
1954. ADMINISTRATION AND REVIEW. It shall be the duty of the Planning 
Commission to administer the provisions of the View Protection Ordinance. Review of 
any site for such purposes shall be initiated by the City pursuant to a View Preserva-
tion Site Inspection or otherwise, or by any person aggrieved. 
1955. POWERS AND DUTIES OF PLANNING COMMISSION. The Planning 
Commission shall hold a public meeting when complaint opposed to any pending 
development addition or alteration has been filed by a person aggrieved or referred by 
the City zone clearance official. In connection with the foregoing, the Planning Com-
mission: 
(a) Shall hear and review such complaints or referrals regarding the proposed con-
struction, alteration, or additions. 
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1950. PURPOSES. The hillsides of the City constitute a limited 
natural resource in their scenic value to all residents of and visi-
tors to the City and their potential for vista points and view lots. 
It is found that the public health, safety and welfare require 
prevention of needless destruction and impairment of views and 
promotion of the optimum utilization and discouragement of the 
blockage and misuse of such sites and view lots. The purpose of 
this ordinance is to promote the health, safety and general welfare 
of the public through: 
(a) The protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of sites 
and view lots that offer views to the residents because of the 
unique topographical features which the Palos Verdes Peninsula 
offers, or which provide unique and irreplaceable assets to the 
City and its neighboring communities or which provide for this 
and future generations examples of the unique physical surround-
ings which are characteristic of the city. 
(b) The maintenance of settings which provide the amenity of a 
view. 
(c) The establishment of a process of design review by which the 
City may render its assistance toward the objective that views 
enjoyed by residents of the City will not be significantly obstruct-
ed.239 
In the underlying case, the city denied a landowner's application for 
a building permit because the landowner's proposal did not conform 
to the objectives of the ordinance. The landowner contested the findings 
of fact240 as insufficient to support the denial of the permit. The court 
affirmed the city commission's finding that "the proposal would have 
an adverse impact on existing views and that appellants had failed to 
provide design alterations to minimize the view impact of their pro-
posal."241 Again, in Ross, the ordinance itself was not challenged as 
beyond the scope of the general welfare prong of the police power; 
(b) May request, following a public meeting, that proposed action on a particular site 
or plans to make any additions to existing structures or new accessory structures on 
the lot in question will meet the mitigation measures of the View Protection Ordinance 
as outlined by the Planning Commission. 
(c) Coordinate and conciliate to the maximum extent possible the resolution of 
disputes among property owners concerning view obstructions. 
1956. APPEAL. Any person aggrieved may appeal the Planning Commission decision 
to the City Council within twenty (20) days after determination of required view 
protection mitigation measures. 
Id. at 562 n.2. 
239Id. 
240 The landowner also challenged the ordinance on vagueness grounds, asserting that terms 
like "needless," "discourage," "significantly obstructed," and others failed to provide procedural 
due process. See id. at 562-63. 
241 Id. at 564. 
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the decision is most noteworthy for the creative ordinance adopted 
by the city. 
In the second type of viewshed ordinance, the visual resource area 
is established as a preservation district. Instead of shaping the per-
missible land uses in the protected area, the ordinance permits few if 
any uses either as of right or conditionally. The point of such districts 
is not to shape land uses in the viewshed, but to prohibit any altera-
tion. 
The preservation approach to viewshed protection may raise tak-
ings implications. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale is a leading decision 
on point.242 In this case, the city amended its zoning ordinances by 
adding a Hillside District ordinance, in order to protect its undevel-
oped McDowell Mountains.243 '!\vo districts were created, the Conser-
vation and Development areas. A "no-development line" established 
the boundary between the districts. This line was located where any 
of the following conditions occurred: "unstable slopes subject to roll-
ing rocks; rockfalls or landslides; bedrock areas; slopes of 15 percent 
or greater; and shallow, rocky mountain soils subject to severe ero-
sion."244 The ordinance required that land within the Conservation 
Area be set aside for the permanent conservation of natural open 
space.245 However, the ordinance allowed for the transfer of develop-
ment rights from the Conservation Area to the Development Area.246 
Corrigan's land was approximately seventy-four percent within the 
Conservation Area.247 
Corrigan illustrates the vulnerability of local governments to chal-
lenges based on a facial taking248 where viewsheds are protected by 
242 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), a/I'd in part, vacated in part, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). 
243 See id. at 532 n.3 (reprinting text of city ordinance). 
244 [d. at 531. These features identified where a mountain began. See id. 
245 The ordinance stated that "[t]he land within the Hillside Conservation area shall be legally 
secured for the conservation of permanent natural open space through easements or dedication 
.... No grading, filling, clearing or excavation of any kind shall be allowed in the Hillside 
Conservation area." [d. at 532 n.3. Furthermore, "[n]o buildings, structures or impermeable 
surfaces are permitted in the Conservation Area." [d. at 532. 
246 See id. 
247 [d. The court also noted that: 
[d. 
A study of the ownership patterns within the Hillside District showed that the land 
remained in a few large ownerships. This study of the ownership patterns revealed 
that owners of property in the mountains, including Corrigan, had developable areas 
below the no-development line (within the so-called 'receiving area') sufficient in size 
to accommodate the transfer of density credits from the land above the no-develop-
ment line .... 
248 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part, that "private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. 
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ordinances leaving few, if any, uses available as of right.249 As the 
United States Supreme Court noted in Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,250 land-use regulation effects a taking ifit "does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests, ... or denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land."251 
The Corrigan trial court found that the Scottsdale ordinance reflected 
legitimate safety concerns by "minimizing the harm from the phe-
nomenon known as rolling rock; preventing rock slides due to blasting; 
reducing the damages from washouts and landslides; and avoiding the 
difficulties of fighting fires in mountainous terrain."252 Furthermore, the 
trial court noted that the McDowell Mountains, which are Scottsdale's 
only mountains, enhance property values in their natural state.253 
Development in the mountains could result in unsightly scarring.254 
Thus, on the coupled rationales of safety and aesthetics, the trial court 
upheld the ordinance.255 
However, the purported nexus to health and safety was unconvinc-
ing to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The court characterized the 
ordinance as an "attempt to preserve scenic or ecologically sensitive 
areas."256 In the court's view, there was no "substantial threat to public 
safety without the ordinance."257 Because regulation for aesthetic ob-
jectives, standing alone, is not constitutional in Arizona, the court 
ruled that the ordinance was not a valid exercise of the police power.258 
V. In a facial challenge, the landowner asserts that the regulation, as drafted, leaves no reason-
able use of the property. The landowner must show that "mere enactment" of the restriction 
constitutes a taking. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Supreme Court has 
characterized the burden on the plaintiff as "an uphill battle." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). 
249 It is unlikely that a takings challenge would succeed with regard to an eyesore or a view 
corridor ordinance. See, e.g., Landmark Land Co. v. City & County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 
1287 (Colo. 1986) (view corridor ordinance does not constitute taking); Temple Baptist Church, 
Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565, 572 (N.M. 1982) (ordinance pertaining to amortization 
of signs does not constitute taking). Application of the Agins/Keystone test would reveal that 
the landowner is left with reasonable use in both of these circumstances. The eyesore prohibition 
allows for other uses; the view corridor ordinance merely shapes land uses, as to height or bulk, 
and does not prohibit construction altogether. 
250 480 U.S. 470, 481 (1987). 
251 [d. at 485 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980». 
252 Corrigan, 720 P.2d at 536. 
253 [d. at 534. 
254 [d. 
255 [d. 
256 [d. at 538. 
257 [d. at 536-37. This position was later clarified in Ranch 57 v. City of Yuma, 731 P.2d 113, 
118-19 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (no "deplorable condition" required for municipal exercise of 
police power). 
258 Corrigan, 720 P.2d at 540. It is worth noting that Corrigan's property was worth 
$31,365,500 before enactment of the regulation and $17,728,000 after enactment. [d. at 539. 
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To the extent that the ordinance accurately can be portrayed as an 
aesthetic regulation-one designed primarily to accomplish viewshed 
protection-the court was entitled to assign less weight to the benefits 
of the regulation in balancing the harm to individuallandowners.259 
Even where health or safety rationales are available, viewshed 
ordinances leaving few allowed uses are constitutionally suspect. For 
example, in Ranch 57 v. City of Yuma, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
reviewed the establishment of "clear zones" for airport operations.26o 
View protection was neither a direct nor an indirect beneficiary of the 
ordinance, but the clear zones allowed no permanent structures ex-
cept for certain fencing.261 Assessing the ordinance under the Key-
stone formulation,262 the court had little difficulty finding that the 
regulation addressed a valid safety concern.263 Nonetheless, the court 
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine if a total depri-
vation of all economically viable use had occurred.264 In such instances, 
application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission265 is likely to result in a finding 
for the landowner.266 
259 A classic statement of the balancing test used by the courts is found in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted): 
If there is a hierarchy of interests the police power serves-and both logic and prior 
cases suggest there is-then the preservation of life must rank at the top. Zoning 
restrictions seldom serve public interest so far up on the scale. More often these laws 
guard against things like "premature urbanization" ... or "preserve open spaces" .. . 
or contribute to orderly development and the mitigation of environmental impacts ... . 
When land use regulations seek to advance what are deemed lesser interests such as 
aesthetic values of the community they frequently are outweighed by constitutional 
property rights . . . . Nonetheless, it should be noted that even these lesser public 
interests have been deemed sufficient to justify zoning which diminishes-without 
compensation-the value of individual properties. 
[d. at 904 (citations omitted). 
260 731 P.2d 113, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), review denied (1987). 
26\ [d. at 115. 
262 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text. 
263 731 P.2d at 119. 
264 [d. 
265 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
266 Justice Scalia, writing for the Lucas majority, reasoned that application of the Agins/Key-
stone balancing test was rendered meaningless where a property owner forfeited all practical 
value by virtue of the regulation. [d. at 2893-94. For a more detailed discussion of Lucas, see 
generally AFTER LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL: LAND USE REGULATION 
AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION (David L. Callies ed., 1992). 
1995] SCENIC LANDSCAPE PROTECTION 741 
3. View Corridors 
An ordinance establishing a view corridor contains several ele-
ments common to eyesore and viewshed regulations. Like the eyesore 
regulation, the corridor ordinance is concerned with the foreground. 
Instead of controlling billboards or junkyards that interfere with the 
scenic vista, the corridor ordinance regulates the location and height 
of structures. Its purpose is to create an angle of vision for city 
dwellers that focuses on a scenic attribute, whether natural or cul-
tural. Like the viewshed ordinance, the view corridor ultimately tar-
gets a specific, not generic, view for protection. 
The most obvious ancestor of modern view corridor ordinances is a 
cap on the height of buildings. For example, Boston quite early im-
posed height limitations on buildings near Beacon Hill and the State 
House.267 Washington, D.C., has long maintained restrictions based on 
the height of the Capitol Building.268 Modern setback or height provi-
sions with respect to capitol buildings are in place in Austin, Denver, 
Lincoln, Sacramento, and Tallahassee.269 
Eyesore regulations and height restrictions are easily adapted to 
protect corridors and openings in the cityscape that focus on scenic 
resources. Some municipalities protect specific view corridors within 
the cityscape. For example, Rochester, New York, protects views of 
the Eastman Theater; Pittsburgh protects views from the urban core 
to its rivers; the cities of Denver, Portland, Seattle, and Burlington, 
Vermont, protect their mountain vistas; and Austin protects its hill-
country views.27o 
Generally, view corridor ordinances require detailed assessment of 
the visual resource before adoption by the local legislature. One com-
mentator has provided the following description of Austin's efforts in 
this regard: 
[Austin] paid particular attention to the policies of the city's com-
prehensive plan, which placed emphasis on maintaining the unique 
character of the community. Sixty important view corridors were 
identified and broken down into four categories (stationary-parks; 
threshold-along entryways to the city; sustained; and dramatic 
glimpses). The study analyzed each view from the specific point 
267 See Parker v. Commonwealth, 59 N.E. 634 (1901); see also Welch v. Swasey, 79 N.E. 745 
(1907) (upholding the validity of Boston's more general regulation of building height), afj'd, 214 
U.S. 91 (1909). 
268 Building Height Limitation Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 452, ch. 263, § 3 (1910) (limiting a citywide 
cap at 110 feet, with some exceptions on Pennsylvania Avenue). 
269 See SMARDON & KARP, supra note 32, at 100. 
270 See id. 
742 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:697 
identified (e.g., was the dome obscured?) and land uses within the 
corridor. The overall economic impact of the proposal was ana-
lyzed along with the economic impact within each corridor.271 
"Less complicated formulas" for assessing view corridors have been 
used in Lincoln and Tallahassee to protect views of state capitol 
buildings.272 
The leading case regarding view corridors is Landmark Land Co. 
v. City and County of Denver.273 Denver has, since 1968, used its 
Mountain View Ordinance274 to protect view corridors. The purpose 
of the nonzoning ordinance is purely aesthetic: 
Section 10-56. Purpose. 
Upon consideration of a recommendation that an ordinance be 
enacted for the purpose of preserving and protecting the health, 
271 Christopher J. Duerksen, Aesthetics and Land-Use Controls: Beyond Ecology and Eco-
nomics, APA Planning Advisory Service Report No. 399, at 21 (1986). 
272 SMARDON & KARP, supra note 32, at 100. 
273 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987). 
274 The ordinance is reprinted in its 1986 form in Duerksen, supra note 271, at 41 app. 
Pertinent provisions of the ordinance not set forth in the text follow: 
Section 10-57. Prohibitions 
No land shall be used or occupied and no structure shall be designed, erected, altered, 
used, or occupied except in conformity with all regulations established in this article 
and upon performance of all conditions herein set forth. 
Section 10-58. Cranmer Park [There are eight sections similar to 10-58 covering about 
14 square miles or 12.5% of the city.] 
a. Adoption of map. The attached map shall be and hereby is approved and adopted 
and the portion thereon indicated by shading or crosshatching shall be and is hereby 
determined to be and is designated as an area necessary for the preservation of a 
certain panoramic view. The restrictive provisions of this article shall be in full force 
and effect as to the portion of the attached map indicated by shading or crosshatching. 
b. Limitations on construction. No part of a structure within the area on the attached 
map indicated by shading or crosshatching shall exceed an elevation of five thousand 
four hundred thirty-four (5,434) feet above mean sea level plus one foot for each one 
hundred (100) feet that the part of a structure is distant from the reference point. 
Whenever a structure lies partially outside and partially inside of the area on the 
attached map indicated by shading or crosshatching, the provisions of this section shall 
apply only to that part of the structure that lies within the area indicated on the map 
by shading or crosshatching. 
c. Reference point. Reference point is a point having an elevation of five thousand four 
hundred thirty-four (5,434) feet above mean sea level and established at the mountain 
view indicator in Cranmer Park, which point is identified on the attached map and 
which point is indicated in the aforesaid Cranmer Park by a cross set in the top step 
of the aforesaid mountain view indicator. 
Section 10-63. Enforcement. 
a. This article shall be enforced by the director of building inspection. The director is 
hereby empowered to enter into and cause any building, other structure, or tract of 
land to be inspected and examined and to order in writing the remedy of any condition 
found to exist thereon or thereat in violation of any provision of this article. 
Duerksen, supra note 271, at 41 app. 
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safety, and general welfare of the people of the city and their 
property therein situate, the council finds: 
1. That the protection and perpetuation of certain panoramic 
mountain views from various parks and public places within the 
city is required in the interests of the prosperity, civic pride and 
general welfare of the people; 
2. That it is desirable to designate, preserve, and perpetuate 
certain existing panoramic mountain views for the enjoyment and 
environmental enrichment of the citizens of the community and 
visitors hereto; 
3. That the preservation of such views will strengthen and pre-
serve the municipality's unique environmental heritage and at-
tributes as a city of the plains at the foot of the Rocky Mountains; 
4. That the preservation of such views will foster civic pride in 
the beauty of the city; 
5. That the preservation of such views will stabilize and enhance 
the aesthetic and economic vitality and values of the surrounding 
areas within which such views are preserved; 
6. That the preservation of such views will protect and enhance 
the city's attraction to tourists and visitors; 
7. That the preservation of such views will promote good urban 
design; 
8. That regular specified areas constituting panoramic views 
should be established by protecting such panoramic views from 
encroachment and physical obstruction.275 
743 
The landowner in question planned to build a twenty-one-story office 
tower, a use available as a matter of right under Denver's zoning 
ordinance. Neighbors proposed an amendment to the view corridor 
ordinance that would have added the proposed office tower site to its 
coverage. The landowner then withdrew the office tower proposal and 
commenced a challenge to the ordinance. In court, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the police 
power.276 The Colorado Supreme Court had little sympathy for the 
claim that aesthetic purposes could not stand alone in Colorado: 
It has been well established that protection of aesthetics is a 
legitimate function of a legislature. [See Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).] Especially in the context of Denver-a city 
whose civic identity is associated with its connection with the 
mountains-preservation of the view of the mountains from a city 
park is within the city's police power.277 
276 See id. 
276 See Landmark Land Co., 728 P.2d at 1286. 
277 [d. at 1285. 
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The court was convinced that the ordinance was "directly related to 
preserving the mountain view,"278 and ruled that no taking resulted 
from the regulation.279 
View corridor ordinances like Denver's blend technical innovation 
with legal theory: empirical preferences and visual assessment are 
key features of view corridor protection. As Landmark shows, this 
purely aesthetic device promotes the general welfare by preserving 
views that reflect the character of the city and its environs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The enhancement of the aesthetic landscape through local regula-
tion is a goal reasonably related to the general welfare. The impor-
tance of visual resource protection, on several fronts, makes it a 
purpose that may stand alone as an exercise of the police power. First, 
the economic benefits of landscape protection cannot be disputed. The 
fact that tourism accounted for a $309 billion contribution to the 
national economy in 1993 speaks for itself. Tourism is driven by an 
appreciation of beauty, among other factors. The protection of the 
visual resource is a necessary component in a successful tourist in-
dustry. 
Second, protection of the visual resource is "inextricably linked" to 
preservation of property values.280 Scenic quality is an important con-
sideration for prospective purchasers. Obstruction of views, and nox-
ious or unaesthetic uses of land plainly decrease market value. As one 
commentary has noted, "[there is] no lack of data for making adjust-
ments based on aesthetic factors. View and proximity to a noxious use 
are just other variables in the marketplace the measurement of which 
is no more subjective than many other factors commonly valued."281 
Thus regulations to protect the visual resource promote the general 
welfare by maintaining property values. 
278 I d. at 1285--86. 
279Id. at 1286; see Krawcheck v. Board of Adjustment of Charleston, 443 S.E.2d 401 (1994). 
The city's view corridor ordinance stated: "In all the Old City Heights Districts, structures shall 
be spaced so that no street prolonged toward the Ashley or Cooper River would be blocked by 
a building, thereby preserving the vista from the East Bay Street, East Battery, Lockwood 
Drive, or Halsey Blvd." Krawcheck, 443 S.E.2d at 403 n.lo Landowners sought permission to 
raze a nonconforming structure and build a bridge across the street between two other struc-
tures. Id. at 403. The impact on the view was found to be less than the existing interference. 
Id. at 404. The court upheld approval of the plans, but did so based on the case law regarding 
nonconforming structures. Id. at 404-06. 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 102-2lo 
281 George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach 
to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 53, 76 (1991). 
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In states that cling to the minority position, promotion of tourism 
or the protection of property values may serve as alternative ration-
ales to justify regulations designed to accomplish primarily aesthetic 
objectives. This may make for a result which is patently illogical but 
practically effective. Counties, cities, and towns in states within the 
minority camp should take full advantage of these alternative ration-
ales to complete their environmental goals. The link between aesthet-
ics, tourism, and property values has rendered continued judicial 
insistence on a health or safety rationale outdated at best. 
Finally, and most importantly, protection of the visual resource 
promotes the general welfare by furthering both communitarian and 
individualistic aims. Central to the theory of communitarianism is the 
idea that individuals draw their identities from the community of 
which they are a part. "For them, community describes not just what 
they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship 
they choose . . . but an attachment they discover, not merely an at-
tribute but a constituent of their identity."282 This statement of com-
munitarianism embodies many of the principles of the emerging the-
ory oflandscape aesthetics,283 which holds that the landscape is crucial 
in defining the community. Moreover, studies demonstrate that the 
landscape may help us define ourselves as individuals. Protection of 
the visual resource promotes greater opportunities for aesthetic ex-
periences such as recreation and leisure. There is an apparent link 
between such aesthetic experience and psychological or philosophical 
well-being. Thus, landscape protection also promotes a more individu-
alistic, liberal agenda. 
In jurisdictions subscribing to the majority position that aesthetics 
can stand alone as a police power goal, the most prevalent form of 
local regulation is the outright prohibition of eyesores. Yet these 
primitive devices contain precious little in the way of appreciation of 
the visual resource, from a liberal or communitarian perspective. This 
does not make for inherently bad regulation; some eyesores are so 
objectionable that an individual preference or community consensus 
to banish them may be presumed. Furthermore, to the extent that 
eyesore regulations continue to restate our collective and intuitive 
preference for trees to billboards, they serve a valuable purpose. 
Viewshed and view corridor ordinances have the potential to merge 
landscape aesthetics with a broad communitarian notion of the gen-
282 MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1992). 
2B3 In this regard, it is instructive to recall Gussow's perspective. See Gussow, supra note 1 
and text accompanying note 5. 
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eral welfare. Both viewshed and view corridor ordinances require 
some determination of visual preferences-some consensus as to what 
is beautiful. But the viewshed and view corridor ordinances reviewed 
in this Article protect more than static snapshots of scenic vistas. The 
cities and towns employing these devices-Denver; Charlestown; Roll-
ing Hills, California; Scottsdale, Arizona-have preserved viewsheds 
and view corridors based upon shared, communitarian ideals. The 
specific protected view, in some locally understood way, helps to define 
the very core of the community. Denver's legislative findings-that 
its panoramic mountain views encourage civic pride and embody the 
city's "unique environmental heritage and attributes as a city of the 
plains at the foot of the Rocky Mountains"284-are a reflection of these 
communitarian ideals. 
Judicial tolerance of aesthetic goals standing alone creates an at-
mosphere in which the visual resource, and the role it plays in shaping 
the community, is freely explored. It elevates the landscape to "more 
than a passive backdrop" and acknowledges that "[t]he visual land-
scape, the environment we see, ... gives shape to our character,"285 
as communities and as individuals. 
284 See supra text accompanying note 275. 
285 See Gussow, supra note 1, at 7. 
